ULUSLARARASI ÖRGÜTLENME VE KÜRESEL YÖNETİŞİM

Stated positively, world order is a condition of the system, marked by the high probability that international relations will be peacefully managed. It suggests cosmos rather than chaos, settled patterns of behavior rather than unpredictability, and agreed rather than forced decisions.

World-order proposals can be classified under the two grand theories of international relations. Under the Realist school, the most prominent proposal has been the classical balance of power theory. Idealist school, undoubtedly, has been more productive relative to the Realist school and produced proposals such as collective security, world government, legalism, functionalism, and cosmopolitanism. The correct answer is B.

In fact, looking from a broader historical perspective, Reves thought that war has occurred wherever and whenever political units of equal sovereignty have faced each other. The solution to the problem of war, then, would be integrating the warring units into a higher sovereignty.

Reves believed that if such a higher authority proves impossible to be created by the consent of nation states, conquest would be permissible.

Cord Meyer, another prominent world governmentalist, has argued that the nation- state was responsible for two world wars within a generation. “As long as the inhabitants of the earth prefer to live as members of sovereign states,” he wrote, “the catastrophe of war will remain the ultimate means of settling their disputes and of protecting their rights and very existence.

One proponent of legalism has been Hans Kelsen. In Peace Through Law, which was published toward the end of the Second World War, Kelsen argued that if the big powers were satisfied in their territorial claims, then following the war they could agree on a legalistic scheme for order.

Some scholars, however, argued against the legalist approach. First, the domestic analogy of legalists may be flawed, because, especially from a liberal perspective, order refers to the political management of group relations rather than either law making or enforcing the law on individuals or nations. Legalists’ starting point has been the domestic analogy, but they too have somewhat mistaken the role of the government in domestic politics.

Functionalism, as another Idealist proposal for world order, argues for the organization of international cooperation not along the line of territoriality but of specific social and economic activities. It stresses cooperative nature of world politics rather than international conflicts and, as such, addresses the problem of war and peace indirectly. The assumption here is that cooperation in economic and social activities would gradually help states to achieve mutual understanding and solve their differences, that is, cooperation in nonpolitical issues would “spill over” to political issues.

Functionalism has been criticized because it assumes that war is the result of economic and social backwardness.

Cosmopolitanists have argued that the state and the state-centric political view have lost their “normative relevance” because of economic, social, technological, and environmental changes taking place in the world, and so a new system of world order, other than a state-system, should be established.

"I" is adopted by cosmopolitanists wheras II and III are criticism against cosmopolitanists.

A specific group of scholars known as WorldOrder-Models-Project (WOMP) scholars (such as Richard Falk, Rajni Kothari, Ali Mazrui, and Gustavo Lagos) have both elaborated on the morality and given specific cosmopolitan proposals for a more orderly world.

Collective security is a partially centralized system in that the possession of power remains diffused among states, but at the same time the use of force in the system is regulated by a central agency such as an international organization with a universal membership. In fact, “collective security is the name given by the planners of a new world order after World War I to the system for maintenance of international peace that they intended as a replacement for the system commonly known as the balance of power” (Claude, 1971: 247).

For Alfred Zimmern, collective security was a new system for managing power, a system that he defined as “the safety of all by all” (Zimmern, 1936: 4).

There are two ideas on the balance of power as a system that deserve attention. First, the balance
of power is a “fallback system” of international relations; in a multistate system, unless analternate system is established for the management of power, it is natural for states to take care of their own security. Put differently, “the balance system is the natural international system in the sense that it does not have to be contrived. In the absence of a different system, states fall back on this one” (Claude, 1990: 35). Secondly, “the contemporary balance of power system is by no means a mere duplicate of systems which have existed in the past” (Claude, 1962: 281). The classical balance system of the earlier centuries has been modified by two major developments in this century; first, the establishment of general international organizations and, second, by institutionalized alliances such as NATO. Then, the system that we have had for the management of power since the establishment of the League of Nations may be called a “modified balance of power system.”

The precise objectives of balance of power system have been a controversy among the scholars of international relations. Objectives of (or benefits of, or the results to be expected from) a successfully operating balance of power system have been argued to be either peace, order, stability, moderation, preserving the independence of states, preserving the integrity of the multistate system, or some combination of these.

Some scholars, however, have thought that not an equilibrium but a preponderance of power would achieve statesmen’s objectives in the system.

Subjective conditions are more critical than objective conditions for establishing a collective security system; without the willingness to pay the costs that collective security envisages, a change in the security environment itself would not create a change in the existing system for the management of power. This is, in fact, the main reason why the end of the Cold War did not engender a collective security system.

World order is associated with a governable system where relations among the constituent units are managed through peaceful means.