ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER TARİHİ

Stalin delay withdrawing Soviet troops from northern Iran (who had been stationed there as part of the Anglo-Soviet agreement of 1942 to prevent the Germans from seizing Persian oil), he also demanded territorial concessions from Turkey, control over the Turkish straits, and a role in the administration of Italy’s former North African colonies as a stepping stone for establishing Soviet naval bases in the eastern Mediterranean.

Even Stalin’s normally quiescent Foreign Minister, Vyacheslav Molotov, told his boss the Allies “won’t allow it” (cited in Resis, 1993:8). By early 1946, the US and Britain had taken their case against the USSR regarding Iran to the United Nations Security Council—the “first significant use of the new world organization to deal with an international crisis” (Gaddis, 2005). What’s more, Truman also deployed the US Sixth Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean, where it remains to this day.

George F Kennan’s “Long Telegram” would become the single most influential document in the Cold War.

After an electoral fiasco in Hungary in November 1945 in which the anti-communist smallholding peasant party received well over 50% of the vote, compared to the communists’ 25%, Stalin decided that no such chances could be taken elsewhere, especially in Germany.

To be one of the largest assistance programs in modern history, the Marshall Plan did not distinguish between those parts of Europe under Soviet control and those that were not. Seeing hunger, poverty, and unemployment as a larger immediate threat to Europe than the Red Army— since the former might more readily push the masses into the hands of Moscow-dominated communist parties than the latter—the Marshall Plan would serve a two-fold purpose: first, provide a material basis that would disabuse Europeans of the promise of communism; second, force the Soviet Union to either accept American aid, thus tacitly admitting the strengths of the capitalist system—or throw up its “own wall” and thus justifying the creation and existence of a Western bloc (Gaddis, 1997).

Both worked better than Washington could have imagined. On the one hand, the Marshall Plan set in motion an economic miracle the likes of which Western Europe had never seen; on the other, it forced Stalin into the incredibly clumsy position of nearly accepting American aid.

All of the items are correct.

As a final institutional measure to solidify the emerging eastern bloc and counter the Marshall Plan, in January 1949 Moscow launched the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, better known as COMECON. With the aim of facilitating the economic development of the eastern bloc, the group’s original members included the USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Poland. Albania joined in 1949, but would leave in 1961 after the Soviet-Albanian split. East Germany joined in 1950, followed by the Mongolian People’s Republic in 1962, Cuba in 1972, and Vietnam, its tenth and final member, in 1978. Though the Warsaw Pact was still six years away, the eastern bloc had been firmly established.

It should not be forgotten that the communist victory in the Chinese Civil War (1927-1949) was also one of the most decisive moments of the 20th century. As the end of a huge and immensely important saga that had first seen the country’s two most powerful political movements, the Kuomintang, i.e. Nationalists under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, and the communists, under the leadership of Mao Zedong, briefly aligned (1924-27) in their common effort to root out warlordism before turning viciously against one another (1927-onward), Mao’s victory in 1949 would shape a large part of 20th century global history. Terrifying the American establishment, many of whom now accused Truman of ‘losing China,’ the communist seizure of power in Beijing went a long way toward convincing the Americans, with the UN and many other nations behind them, to go to war in Korea the following year (1950-53). What’s more, Mao’s victory also diluted the USSR’s monopoly on socialist power. With two great eastern states now firmly vying for the position of the world’s ‘most revolutionary,’ the dual nature of the rivalry for world mastery (Moscow vs. Washington) had in some sense now been surpassed.

The former, the Australian-New Zealand, United States Pact (ANZUS), signed in 1951, committed Australia, New Zealand, and the United States to a nonbinding collective defense treaty in which each country considered an attack on one of them to be an attack on all.

Differences over Vietnam and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia delayed détente until the signing of the first Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 between the US, Soviet Union, and 41 other states. According to the NPT, member states were divided into two categories. Within these categories, Nuclear-Weapon States were the privileged few allowed to have nuclear weapons in their arsenals—France, the US, China, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. The rest of the world were Non-Nuclear Weapon States (Tertrais, 2005: 1).
In many respects NPT was the product of both European and superpower détente, and a new balance of power in the world.

fifty

1945-1950.

Britain

the London Six Power Conference

After Clement Attlee replaced Winston Churchill as prime minister .

on March 12, 1947

From the late 1940 and early 1950 onward.

While the Korean War was raging (1950-53)

During the Geneva Conference of 1954.

Mikhail Gorbachev