Foreign Policies of the Central Asian States

Modernization theory states that history progresses in a linear model from primitive to modern societies, reaching communism at the end. After establishing the Soviet Union within the boundaries of the former Russian Empire, the Bolshevik government began national delimitation and nation-building, which lasted through the 1920s and most of the 1930s. In the early Soviet period, even voluntary assimilation was actively discouraged, and the promotion of the national self-consciousness of the non-Russian populations was attempted. The aim was to to build nations out of the numerous ethnic groups in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union drew national borders and pushed the region’s people to category themselves with a particular ethnic identity. As a result, every village, indeed every individual, had to declare an ethnic allegiance. Each officially recognized ethnic minority, even small ones, was granted its national territory where it enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy, national schools, and national elites.

They divided Turkistan and created five national states in the region. By creating five Soviet states in Turkistan, the Soviets defined the nationalities in these states: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. 

Stalin changed ethnic minorities’ policies significantly in the 1930s–1940s with Russification’s initiation, abolishing the national institutions, killing local, national intellectuals, and ethnic deportations. During and after the Second World War, millions of ethnic groups, mostly from Caucasus and Crimea, were expelled to Central Asia without warning the local authorities, further complicating the region’s ethnic structure. Among them were Koreans, Germans, Poles, Finns, Ukrainians, Greeks, Armenians, Chechens, and Ingush, Karachay and Meskhetian Turks, Crimean Tatars. In 1954, more Slavs were brought to CA and settled in Kazakh land under the program called “Virgin Lands.” These deportations changed CA’s ethnic and religious structure and caused many ethnic clashes during and after the Soviet eras.

As a result of the Perestroika and Glasnost policies of Gorbachev, Soviet Union loosened its grip on the republics; ethnic conflicts and independence movements gained momentum. First, the Baltic States (Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia) declared independence. Central Asian Republics declared independence one after another: Kyrgyzstan on 31 August 1991, Uzbekistan on 1 September 1991, Tajikistan on 9 September 1991, Turkmenistan on 27 October 1991, and Kazakhstan on 16 December 1991. 

All CAS joined the CIS by signing Almaty Protocol on December 21, 1991. On 22 January 1993, the Charter of the CIS was signed, setting up the different institutions of the CIS, clarifying their functions, the rules, and statutes of the CIS. Turkmenistan has not ratified the Charter and therefore is not officially a member of the CIS. Nonetheless, it has regularly participated in the CIS as if it were a member state. 

Since the time of independence, Russia has been the most influential external power in Central Asia. Moscow had close connections with all the existing Central Asian governments. It continued to maintain tens of thousands of troops in the region and have very close economic ties. Although Russia was weak politically and economically after the collapse of the Soviet Union, all Russian governments, including former communists and the democrats headed by President Boris Yeltsin, generally supported the status quo regimes in Central Asia. They feared that Islamic radicalism would spread throughout Central Asia and into the predominantly Muslim regions of Russia. Russia considered former Soviet borders as Russian security borders. Andrei Kozyrev, Russian Foreign Minister in the early 1990s, had defended Russian intervention in the Tajik civil war by claiming that it was needed to halt the spread of Islamic radicalism, terrorism, drug, and arms trafficking. In the summer of 1993, Moscow sent an additional 10,000 Russian troops to guard Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan, from where the opponents of Tajikistan’s restored Communist regime received arms and sanctuary.

After independence, Central Asian countries followed similar paths in their foreign policies. Four CAS (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan) signed the CIS Collective Security Treaty (CSTA) with Russia on May 15, 1992. This Treaty prohibited member republics from having a security pact with other states which are not part of the CIS Collective Treaty. Although Turkmenistan did not sign the CSTA, it signed a bilateral security agreement with Russia in June 1992, establishing a special military relationship.There were several reasons for the Central Asian States to rely on Russia for security. First, they did not have the expertise or resources to establish their defense system. Second, the ruling elites in these countries wanted Russia to help them stay in power. Third, there was still a significant Russian population in CASs, especially in Kazakhstan. 

Multi-vectorness is understood as participation in multilateral economic and political associations along with the establishment of bilateral ties with influential intra- and extra-regional actors. It should be effective when strong and balanced liaisons are constructed in politics and economics without over-reliance on any single partner, no matter how attractive or indispensable it may seem.  CAS’s foreign policies are also in line with security policies. They wanted to establish good relations with the West, the United States, Europe,and the East; China, Japan, South Korea, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and even Israel as well as others. Most CAS declared foreign policy concepts and officially adopted multi-vector foreign policy. They all joined the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). 

The newly established CAS confronted many problems left over from the Soviet era. The economic crisis from 1985 intensified in the early years of the independence of the CAS. The collapse of the Soviet Union and breaking off the economic network established during the Soviet Union worsened the condition. There were major crises in the social, cultural, education, and health fields. One of the leading international issues CAS faced after independence was the demarcation of their borders. Intra-Soviet borders between union republics suddenly became borders between independent states, and thus with importance, they were never designed for. To resolve border issues, three CAS joined Russia and China to establish the “Shanghai Five” in 1996. The Shanghai Five consists of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and  Tajikistan. Creating a regional organization emerged from a series of border demarcation and demilitarization talks that the four former Soviet republics held with China. Uzbekistan joined as the sixth member,and all six heads of state signed the Declaration of Shanghai Cooperation  Organization (SCO) on 15 June 2001. 

1) Border problems: Although SCO resolved border issues between Russia and China, between China and CAS, it did not help to solve border problems among CAS. This state of affairs dramatically hinders the development of full-fledged economic and social cooperation among the CAS. Border problems are particularly relevant for Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, in whose relations the border issue is especially noticeable because of Fergana Valley, a multi-ethnic region divided between the three states.

2)  Breakdown of regional systems of energy, transportation, and agriculture:  Soviets created dependencies among CAS in terms of energy, transportation, and agriculture. After independence, individual states had to rely on themselves or resolve it involving neighboring states. New roads, dams, and electricity grids were needed to be built. The need for investment made CAS vulnerable to international influence. 

3) Cross-border waters: Water management has been the cause of frequent conflicts, and tensions between countries with water-rich upstream countries (Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, for example) and those are downstream countries with a substantial degree of dependence on water coming from upstream countries, such as Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Conflicts here are basically over two cross-border watercourses in the region-Amu Darya and the Syr Darya. Moreover, water usage was a problem
at the local level because of arbitrary borders. 

Russian- Chinese joint project to establish control over Central Asia and prevent the entrance of the United States. In any case, however, with or without the US presence, Russian-Chinese geopolitical control of this kind is just another form of external dominance of the region’s countries and their falling into a new form of dependence.

There were several reasons: First, the leadership of CAS could not agree on long-standing issues such as water, border, energy, and agriculture. Second, CAS relations with each other were affected by the personalities of the leaders. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan competed to be the leader of the region. The conflict between Nazarbayev and Karimov prevented a summit in Central Asia for many years. The third reason for the lack of unity is that the outside powers, mainly Russia, have tried to prevent any integration and regional alliances among CAS. 

With the coming to power of new presidents in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, Central Asian leaders met on March 15, 2018, for the first time since 2009. Before this summit, only five summits were held with the participation of all leaders of CAS. The last meeting was on the Aral Sea issues in 2009. Besides, during the previous ten years, the relations had deteriorated on topics such as water, border, energy, and agriculture. On 29 November 2019, the second Consultative meeting of Central Asian states’ heads was held in Tashkent
with all five states’ presidents.

“The Great Game” refers to the political, economic, diplomatic, and spying clash between the British and the Russian Empire over Afghanistan and Central Asia during the 19th century. The establishment of trade routes to Bukhara by the British saw the beginning of the ‘Great Game’ in 1830. Britain was interested in protecting India, sell British goods to Central Asia, while Russia wanted to expand its control southwards. The contest continued until 1895, when new borders were established to define the two empires’ boundaries. In the late 1990s, some analysts used the term “The New Great Game” to describe a renewed geopolitical interest in Central Asia based on the region’s mineral wealth, which was becoming available to great power competition after the termination of the Soviet Union. The major players have been Russia, the United States of America, China, India.

In the beginning, Russia tried to hold on to political, economic advantages over the other great powers on the CAS due to the Soviet legacy of being a regional hegemon. The USA and Europe entered the competition in the region. China and India joined the game much later. While the USA’s influence has decreased over the years, China increased its influence with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

1. Democratization: When the Soviet Union collapsed, the United States government has actively promoted democratization in Central Asia. As with other former Soviet republics, American recognition of the newly independent states of Central Asia only happened after they agreed to accept the principles of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE).

2. Benefit from oil and gas reserves: Besides democratization, US oil companies were interested in oil and gas reserves. 

3. Security: After the September 11, 2001 attack, the US interest focused on security and established several military bases in CAS to help Afghanistan’s war effort. However, the USA began to lose its influence, especially after the region’s color revolutions and its gradual withdrawal from Afghanistan after 2010.

After the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, the region became a U.S. ally in the global war on terror, and Western troops were deployed in several Central Asian countries. Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan governments allowed the US to open military bases in their countries. In contrast, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan only allowed U.S.-led coalition flights over its territory to combat the Taliban in Afghanistan (Saidazimova, 2006). 

On July 5, 2005, at the SCO Summit, leaders of SCO member countries issued a declaration calling for the United States to set a timeline for closing the military bases and its military forces’ withdrawal from the region The Uzbek government asked the USA to close its military base in Khanabad. The USA closed the base in November 2005. However, the Kyrgyzstan government had played a double card declaring an anti-American statement at the SCO meeting. However, it changed its mind when US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld visited Kyrgyzstan in July 2005. Kyrgyzstan continued double play till the revolution in 2010, bringing the Kurmanbek Bakiyev regime to an end. In 2009, the Bakiyev government announced the base’s closing down, but it reversed its decision after the USA increased the annual rent from $17 million to $60 million. Finally, the new president Almazbek Atambayev closed the American base in Manas Airport in June 2014. 

The USA and the EU are in favor of democratization and regime change. The predominantly authoritarian leaders of CAS
prefer Russia and China over the USA and EU in their foreign relations. There is widespread negative public opinion in Central Asia that the United States inspired the so-called 2003 “Rose Revolution” in Georgia, the 2004 “Orange Revolution in Ukraine,” the March 2005 “Tulip Revolution” in Kyrgyzstan, and the May 2005 unrest in Andijan (Uzbekistan). Allegations about such a conspiracy are mostly based on assertions that US-based organizations provided funds to local non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

The Russian policy towards Central Asia could be explained by constructivist and (neo)realist theories. Constructivism is best manifested in the geopolitical discourse of civilizational Eurasianism. Eurasianism can be defined as an ideology that affirms Russia and its “margins” occupy a median position between Europe and Asia, that their specific features have to do with their culture being a “mix” born of the fusion of Slavic and Turko-Muslim peoples, and that Russia should specifically highlight its Asian features. The (neo)realist perspectives of foreign policy reflect the national interest and national security. 

The 201st Military Base, which is the largest Russian military base outside the Russian Federation, is hosted by Tajikistan. During the Tajik civil war (1992-1997), Russia supported pro-government forces fighting against the opposition, including Islamists and secularist forces. The intensified military and security cooperation of Russia with the former Soviet Union republics was institutionalized in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), whose permanent military base was established in Kant, Kyrgyzstan, in 2002. The base hosts part of the Collective Rapid Deployment force (CRDF) designed to support the region’s collective security. To coordinate states’ efforts in the fight against terrorism, the Russian leadership initiated the CIS Anti- Terrorist Center (ATC) with its structural subdivision in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Today, Kyrgyzstan hosts four Russian military facilities: Kant Air Base, the 338th naval communication center, the 954th torpedo testing range, and a seismographic station. Russia has maintained critical military installations in Kazakhstan, too: The Balkhash radar station was established against southeastern threats during the Soviet Union and functioned as part of Russia’s missile attack warning system. It is closed in the summer of 2020 because Russia did not need it anymore. The Sary Shagan antiballistic missile testing range is still in use today. The Baikonur Cosmodrome, the world’s first and largest space launch facility located in southern Kazakhstan, has been leased to Russia till 2050. 

China had two main security concerns and one economical reason to keep relations close with CAS. First, China was initially interested in securing the Western borders with Central Asia because the borders with the Soviet Union were not demarcated before the collapse. Secondly, due to close ethnic links between the Central Asian nations and minority groups in China’s Xinjiang Province, China considers the resurgence of religion and nationalist movements in Central Asia as serious threats to China’s national unification, which were especially imperative in the early 1990s. Finally, As China developed economically and its energy needs increasing, Chinese relations with CAS became economical. Beijing has built five cross-border pipelines from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and has also become an influential player in the region. To diversify its export roads, China launched the Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI).This comprehensive investment project can be seen as an economical move by China to Europe on land and sea. 

Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA) is an international transport program currently involving the European Union and 12 member States of the Eastern European, Caucasian and Central Asian region (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Iran,  Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Romania, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan) stablished in May 1993 for the development
of transport initiatives.

Kazakhstan wanted to establish and have good relations with major powers and its neighboring Central Asian countries. For this reason, a multivector foreign policy approach has been officially adopted for the recognition and reputation of Kazakhstan, and this policy is still in force. The second part of the Foreign Policy Concept is stated as follows: “Kazakhstan’s foreign policy is based on the principles of multi-vector, balance, pragmatism, mutual benefit, and solid defense of its national interests”. New President Kassym-Zhomart Tokayev issued a new Foreign Policy Concept on March 6, 2020. The new concept repeats the principles from the old concept but adds new principles: “The promotion of building a stable, fair and democratic world order; equal integration into the global political, economic and humanitarian space; effective protection of the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of Kazakh citizens and compatriots living abroad.” 

• Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan: The relationship between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan is considered the closest relationship in Central Asia, mainly in the socio-cultural context. There is no problem with territorial claims between them. Both countries have membership in the same  organizations. These are CSTO, SCO, CICA, EAEU, and the CIS Council of Heads of State. In the post-Soviet era, both countries sought to have prosperity and stability. Strong economic cooperation between the two countries is essential to achieve this goal. Significantly, Kazakhstan’s investments in Kyrgyzstan’s agriculture and tourism sector are increasing. Kyrgyzstan is dependent on Kazakhstan in many issues and follows Kazakhstan in some of its policies.
• Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan:  They quickly developed their bilateral relations after gaining their independence. They even formalized their friendship by making an eternal friendship agreement in 1997 and 1998. Uzbekistan is a very profitable market for exports of grain and flour for Kazakhstan. Agricultural products of Uzbekistan are also exported to Kazakhstan. Bilateral cooperation between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan is of great importance in the transport and communication sector.
• Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan: Economic and political relations between Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan are limited. The geographical location of Turkmenistan has strategic importance for Kazakhstan. The easing of sanctions against Iran from the west contributed to improving Kazakhstan’s transportation via Turkmenistan. Economic cooperation between Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Iran is highly probable. In addition, transport between Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan is vital in terms of providing transit transportation between China and Europe. 
• Kazakhstan and Tajikistan: Despite the relatively modest economic and political weight of Tajikistan on the scale of Central Asia, this republic is of critical importance for maintaining the region’s security and stability. It is in Kazakhstan’s interests to maintain the sovereignty, stability, and economic revival of the Republic of Tajikistan. Kazakhstan is one of the leading trade partners for Tajikistan. Nur-Sultan and Dushanbe have established practical cooperation in two main areas: security and energy. In the trade, economic, and investment areas, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan may cooperate successfully in mining, agriculture, construction, and transportation. It is assumed that Kazakhstan could invest in various projects in these sectors. In the energy sector, Tajikistan is an essential link in terms of further development of regional integration. Kazakhstan supports Tajikistan hydroelectric power development efforts as long as Tajikistan respects downstream countries’  interests. Furthermore, Kazakhstan’s main investment activity objects are the banking sector, the mining industry, and energy. Maintaining close cultural and humanitarian ties between the two republics remains essential. Tajikistan needs help from Kazakhstan to educate its citizens in the universities of the Republic of Kazakhstan.  

Among CAS, Kyrgyzstan has been the most liberal, democratic, and open to the world. During the first decade after independence, Kyrgyzstan’s foreign policy objectives were to strengthen internal and external security, gain political support and cooperation in the international arena, and obtain the necessary technical and financial assistance. The current Foreign Policy Concept of the Kyrgyz Republic was adopted on March 11, 2019. It emphasizes the Kyrgyz Republic’s unique role in Central Asia as a bridge between Europe and Asia. Therefore, Kyrgyzstan is pursuing a pragmatic, balanced, open, multi-vector, and consistent foreign policy. The foreign policy concept of the Kyrgyz Republic prioritizes the following points: ensuring national security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Kyrgyz Republic; full demarcation of the state borders of the Kyrgyz Republic; creation and strengthening of confidence-building measures in border zones with neighboring countries; forming a friendly environment and strengthening good neighborliness with the states of the Central Asian region; strengthening and deepening relationships with allies and strategic partners, as well as close interaction within global, regional organizations and integration associations; development of all-round mutually beneficial cooperation with the states of near and far abroad in bilateral and multilateral formats. Kyrgyzstan has had difficulty implementing independent foreign policy and has been under geopolitical pressure from the United States, Russia, China, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. Kyrgyzstan, which is also weak in terms of military and economy, had to follow a more flexible and balanced foreign policy, taking into account both the behavior of the countries of the region and the interests of the great states within the framework of the geopolitical situation of Central Asia. 

Tajikistan is the only country that fell into a civil war right after independence between 1992-1997. Tajikistan, which was open to foreign countries’ influence and intervention during the Civil War, could not form a foreign policy completely independent of regional and global dynamics. Russia intervened in the Tajik Civil War on behalf of the Tajik government and pushed the conflicting sides to stop the conflict. Russia has also intervened to protect Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan and prevent drug trafficking, especially between 1999-2004. The current Concept of Foreign policy was adopted in 2015. Tajikistan, similar to other Central Asian republics, declares a multi-vector nature of its foreign policy. In this regard, the Republic of Tajikistan’s foreign policy in the Concept is defined as an independent multi-vector foreign policy based on unconditional respect for international law, implemented on an objective and pragmatic basis. On the geopolitical field, Dushanbe, to one degree or another, meets the interests of the leading world and regional players - the Russian Federation, China, the United States, the EU, NATO, Iran, India, and Pakistan. Russia remains the primary conductor in the security sphere, while China is the principal investor.

Turkmenistan is the only CAS that embraced the permanent neutrality principle in foreign policy. Neutrality implies a refusal to participate in wars and peacetime - non-participation in military blocs. Therefore, Turkmenistan is not a member of any military political bloc. Turkmenistan attaches great importance to a strategic partnership with Russia, including its separate regions, the largest industrial, scientific, educational, and cultural centers. At present, in Ashgabat’s foreign policy activities, the eastern vector’s predominance is sharply marked by China’s transformation into Turkmenistan’s leading partner. Perhaps, among the countries of Central Asia, Turkmenistan is the most committed supporter of the Chinese project, the Belt and Road Initiative, as a new regional cooperation model.

At the time of independence, Uzbekistan’s government firmly committed to preserving the status quo both domestically and internationally by maintaining the political and economic structure of the Soviet past. Security concerns originating from the geopolitical position and mercantilist ideology determined Uzbekistan’s foreign policy till the death of former president Islam Karimov in 2016. Uzbekistan continued to use political Islam, terrorism, and drug trafficking threats to justify its increasingly isolationist stance in the region. Distrust of its immediate neighbors, as well as Russia and China’s intentions, has prompted Uzbekistan to abstain or withdraw its memberships from most major economic and security organizations in the region. Thus, Uzbekistan’s foreign policy during the 1990s can be explained by the realist paradigm of International Relations by pursuing a national interest and preferring bilateral relations over multilateral cooperation. Therefore, regime security and national sovereignty determined the foreign
relations of Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan avoided multilateral relations when it gained the expected benefits via bilateral ties. Uzbekistan felt western criticism of Uzbekistan’s human rights record, insistence on liberal economic policies and political reform, and accepting nongovernmental organizations as interference to its sovereignty. Although Uzbekistan partnered with the USA to fight against threts from Afganistan, when political disorder broke out in eastern Uzbekistan in the city of Andijan in June 2005, Uzbek officials responded with force, even attracting more criticism from the West. As a result, Uzbekistan got closer to Russia after severing ties with the West. Uzbekistan found the perfect partner as China entered the New Great Game with the SCO. Unlike the West, China had no interest in human rights and democracy, and unlike Russia, China had no interest in dominating CAS politically and militarily, at least not yet. China was interested in maintaining regional security and fight against religious extremism, separatism, terrorism, and other actual threats.  All these foreign policy measures were reflected in the first-ever foreign policy concept paper on August 1, 2012. This document defined two main directions of foreign policy. First, it established military neutrality by prohibiting entry into military-political blocs, the deployment of foreign military bases on the territory of Uzbekistan, the sending of troops to participate in military conflicts abroad, including in peacekeeping missions and the mediation of any external power in the resolution of regional disputes in Central Asia. Second, it declared Central Asia a priority region of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy (Tolipov, 2012). Declaring Central Asia a priority makes sense for three reasons: First, demarcation of borders, especially with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, remains an essential conflict source. Second, as a downstream country, Uzbekistan depends on international rivers for its agriculture, originating from upstream countries, such as Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Third, as a landlocked country, Uzbekistan needs its neighbors for trade. In September 2016, Islam Karimov died, and Shavkat Mirziyoyev became the new president of Uzbekistan, and a new era started in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy. Compared to Karimov, Mirziyoyev established better interpersonal relations with world leaders and has been more active in foreign relations. However, in terms of foreign policy principles, not much has changed. Like Uzbekistan’s 2012 Foreign Policy Concept, the newly adopted “Development Strategy for 2017- 2021” emphasizes national independence and sovereignty, as well as the maintenance of balanced relations with other countries. While maintaining its non-aligned status, Uzbekistan is open to dialogue and is interested in expanding cooperation with all partners in the name of peace, progress, and prosperity. Tashkent’s foreign policy is a unique experience in the post-Soviet era, aimed at preserving and strengthening the republic’s real independence. Currently, Uzbekistan is making the primary efforts in the foreign policy direction to build new transport infrastructure in the region, creating favorable conditions for the development of interstate trade and economic relations and projects. Uzbekistan also adopts the policy of liberalizing the monetary and financial sphere in the international context and ultimately transforming Uzbekistan into a regional transport and investment hub.