JEOPOLİTİK STRATEJİ

Brazil’s response to the Pacific Alliance was the launch of the Integration of Regional Infrastructures project, which also reflected Brasília’s recognition of the significance of the Pacific region and its quest to connect the Atlantic and Pacific (Nolte and Wehner, 2015: 38; Lowenthal and Baron, 2014: 32). The growing trans-Pacific trade ushered in an enhanced prominence of the Panama Canal, the proposals for the creation of the Nicaragua Canal as well as the rising strategic importance of Pacific-facing countries, such as Peru and Chile, to Brazil.

In 2012, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru launched the Pacific Alliance, which primarily seeks to expand free trade between these countries. Except for the Pacific Alliance, all of these regional integration schemes sought to isolate the US and Canada from participating in the new regional institutions.

The Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) was created through the signing of the Treaty of Asuncion in 1991 between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay to design a South American common market.

The Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) was created through the signing of the Treaty of Asuncion in 1991 between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay to design a South American common market.

It is crucial to highlight five defining processes that have been shaping the new geopolitical scenario in the Western Hemisphere:

• Declining of the US power in the Americas

• Latin American governments’ enhanced autonomy in regional and global affairs

• The resurgence of the left and post-hegemonic regionalism

• Emergence of regional leaders to fill the void left by the US (Brazil and Venezuela)

• China’s rise and global multipolarity

• Commodity boom

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is a free trade agreement created in 1994 by Canada, Mexico and the United States.

The Andean Community is a trade bloc created by Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela in 1996.

UNASUR and the SDC sought to enhance regional security cooperation and produce public security goods as well as designing and implementing policies such as conflict mediation. Brazil’s regional security policy also reflected the principles of consensual hegemony. Rather than providing material security goods through military spending, Brazil’s regional leadership in the security realm had a robust ideational dimension. Geopolitically, Brasília aimed to reinforce a regional security identity to prevent external interference from Europe and North America (Burges, 2017: 175). On many occasions, Brazil expressed in words its support for the protection of norms such as democracy and sovereignty in the region, which constituted the main foundations of the security concept that it advocated. Brazil’s direct interventions in the Ecuadorian–Peruvian War in 1995 and the Haitian crisis in 2004 constituted exceptional cases. Brazil only intervened when it perceived that the arbitration was necessary to maintain its stature as a regional power and an important global actor (Burges, 2008: 79). As the regional integration process deepened, UNASUR appeared as the major conflict mediator and crisis manager under the leadership of Brazil, thereby replacing the role of the OAS. The South American region witnessed UNASUR’s successful efforts in managing the Bolivian crisis (2008) and mediating the dispute between Colombia and Venezuela (2010) (Nolte and Wehner, 2012: 10–11; Sanahuja, 2017). UNASUR and the SDC thus reflected autonomist strategies aimed at counterbalancing the US’s power in the Western Hemisphere. Similarly, these institutions constituted an alternative to the OAS, which was primarily driven by US preferences, and thus challenged the US’s primacy in shaping the region’s security agenda (Nolte and Wehner, 2012).

As the second-largest economy in the world, China’s engagement with the Latin American region over the last two decades has had important implications for the region and its relations with the US. China recently expanded its trade, military and investment ties with the region, fuelled by its commodity demand, in order to expand its own industrialisation (Ellis, 2016: 291). China’s trade volume with Latin America increased from 12 billion USD in 2000 to 260 billion USD in 2013. Chinese loans reached 37 billion USD in 2010 and decreased to 29 billion in 2015, whereas they had remained under 1 billion USD until 2008 (Piccone, 2016: 3). China displaced the US as the main trade partner of Brazil, Chile and Peru. The share of Latin American imports from the US out of its total imports saw a decline from 50 percent in 2000 to 33 percent in 2016. China’s share in Latin American imports increased from 3 percent to 18 percent in this period (Oppenheimer, 2017). From 2000 onward, Chinese presidents Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping made several visits to Latin American countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Mexico and Venezuela. In these visits, China’s aim was to enhance cooperation with the region in various areas, such as energy, trade, infrastructure, finance, technology and the military, based on South–South Cooperation and mutual respect for national sovereignty (Ellis, 2016: 296; Piccone, 2016).

From the mid-1990s onward, Brazil started to view South America as part of its sphere of influence, and also sought to enhance its role in the Caribbean region (Serbin, 2014:71; Flemes, 2009). In Central America, Brazil did not exert much power where it faced substantial competition from Mexico (Burges, 2017: 198–199). In contrast to the Latin American identity, the idea of a distinct South America was a recent creation. During the mid-1990s, Brazilian president F. H. Cardoso (1995–2002) promoted a South American regional identity with its separate geopolitical agenda. Later president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–2011) prioritised the achievement of prosperity and stability in the sub-region as a primary foreign policy goal. Brazil views Argentina as its main partner in deepening the South American integration project (Flemes, 2009: 167; Burges, 2017: 199–200). Labelled by Burges (2008; 2015), the idea of “consensual hegemony” (later “cooperative hegemony”) was the result of Brazil’s search for a new position in a changing global order: a unipolar world order after the Cold War, globalisation and US detachment from the region. In the past, Brazil had followed different strategies to insert itself into the international system, such as Third-Worldism or siding with the US. In the new scenario, Brazil’s response was to recast its identity as a sub-regional consensual hegemony by forging the construction of an autonomous, integrated South America (Burges, 2008: 74). The Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff (2011–2016) governments also focused on Africa and the Global South, expanding Cardoso’s geopolitical imagination beyond the Americas (Burges, 2017). These leaders crafted regional institutions (MERCOSUR and UNASUR) and participated actively in extra-regional alliances (BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa; IBSA – with India and South Africa; and the G20 for trade) in an effort to enhance regional autonomy, reform global governance and counterbalance the US hegemony (Serbin, 2014; Williams, 2012).

A regional power is a leading country in a region which is able to project its power through the provision of public goods. A regional power should be able to garner support through consent. A regional power is also capable of representing regional interests at the global level. Therefore, the correct option is B.

The Cuban Revolution of 1959, led by Marxist-Leninist Fidel Castro, ignited the US’s fears of an expansion of communist regimes in the region. In response, the John F. Kennedy administration initiated a generous economic aid programme, the Alliance for Progress, which was underpinned by the idea that economic development would gradually lead to democracy. The programme would thus contribute to a process of evolutionary change, referred to as “peaceful revolution”, in contrary to the communist idea of revolution. Therefore, the correct option is A.

In the early 1990s, the Andean–Amazon region gained importance in the US’s strategic thinking, thanks to the emergent drug trafficking problem in these areas.

With regard to oil, Mexico and Venezuela were of vital importance to US interests. In the 1990s, Mexico became the fourth oil supplier to the US, while Canada and Venezuela both replaced Saudi Arabia, as the largest oil supplier. This period also saw an enhanced focus on economic issues in inter-American relations. Mexico stood out as the US’s second-most important trade partner, surpassing Japan in 1997. By the mid-1990s, trade with Mexico comprised more than half of the trade with the Latin American region. Therefore, the correct option is D.

Washington modified the US’s strategic priorities in the region and adopted policies promoting the expansion of markets and democracy across the continent. The Bill Clinton (1993-2001) administration initiated two schemes that aimed to create a single-hemispheric economic and security agenda under the aegis of US leadership: the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) in December 1994 and the Cooperation for Hemispheric Security in July 1995. In terms of protecting democracy, Washington created various initiatives through the OAS (for instance, the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy). Therefore, the correct option is A.

The Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) was created through the signing of the Treaty of Asuncion in 1991 between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay to design a South American common market. Therefore, the correct option is C.

Over the last two decades, Brazil and Venezuela have increased their prominence as emergent regional powers, partly filling the vacuum created by the decline of US influence in the Western Hemisphere. Brazil’s regional leadership has especially attracted a great deal of attention in the scholarly debates. Although there is still uncertainty about the effects of Brazil’s regional hegemony, an analysis of Brazil’s increasing influence as a regional leader is essential for comprehending the new power dynamics in the Americas. Brazil is the eighth-largest economy in the world. It has managed to achieve high levels of industrialisation, modernise its agriculture and become a leading exporter of both agricultural and manufacturing goods. Therefore, the correct option is E.

The Andean Community is a trade bloc created by Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela in 1996. Therefore, the correct option is B.

Although the members of the Pacific Alliance, Chile, Colombia and Peru, maintained cordial relations with Brazil, they signed bilateral free trade agreements with Washington. As Briceño -Ruiz (2018) put it, the Pacific Alliance emerged during the post-hegemonic era in the region, but it did not pursue post-liberal regionalist strategies. Since its launch, the member countries formulated the Alliance in ideological opposition to the post-liberal regional integration models. Therefore, the correct option is C.

Reprimarisation refers to an increasing participation of agrarian and mining products in exports. Therefore, the correct option is D.