JEOPOLİTİK STRATEJİ - Deneme Sınavı - 12

Despite the unfavorable perception of geopolitics by European states and peoples because of its past links with imperialism, nationalism and fascism, geography has always played a central role in determining the internal and external borders of Europe, as well as the design and conduct of European integration.

Geopolitics is not a popular term in Europe despite the fact that earlier geopolitical theories originated there during the second half of 19th century and onwards. Specifically, these theories have been associated with militarism, nationalism and fascism in the early 20th century and then linked theoretically with the Realist school of international relations. Thus the concept of geopolitics has been largely unpopular in Europe, while the arrival of European integration has only consolidated this unfavorable view, since the idea of a supranational union was conceived as an antidote to geopolitical thinking, and hence the EU gained a reputation as an anti-geopolitical entity. With its characteristics of normative and civilian power, the EU experience in foreign policy is not coherent with classical geopolitical thought, either. On the other hand, such breaking points in recent political history as the end of the Cold War, the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the Ukraine Crisis, has led to the resurgence of geopolitics and geopolitical thinking in European politics, and have posed a great and disturbing challenge for the EU’s normative and civilian power qualities.

The boundaries between the nations in Europe has been drawn up based upon two different principles: (1) the natural border theory based on the drainage divides of mountains on the borderlines and (2) the principle of linearity and hydrofrontiers such as river or lakes located on the inter-state borders.

The boundaries between the nations in Europe has been drawn up based upon two different principles: (1) the natural border theory based on the drainage divides of mountains on the borderlines and (2) the principle of linearity and hydrofrontiers such as river or lakes located on the inter-state borders.

Drainage divides or water courses play a central role as the basis of the natural border theory. Following physical geography logic, international borders are drawn using these natural formations, while they provide a useful means in mountainous areas of separating one nation from another, as exemplified in southern, northern and central Europe by the FrancoSpanish, Swedish-Norwegian and Polish-Czech and Polish-Slovakian borders in the Pyrenees, the Scandinavian and the Carpathian Mountains respectively.

The second principle relates to linearity which is founded on water courses such as rivers or lakes. This principle is applied in many parts of Europe where there are lots of rivers flowing towards the seas or oceans, and a few lakes forming hydrofrontiers. In the north, the long Finnish-Swedish border is marked by rivers such as Könkämäeno, Muonio and Torne, while the border between Russia’s Kaliningrad and Lithuania follows the Neman River. In southeastern Europe, parts of the Maritsa River constitute the Turkish-Greek border, just as the Danube River, Europe’s second longest, marks the borders between Slovakia-Austria, SlovakiaHungary, Croatia-Serbia and Bulgaria-Romania along its course towards the Black Sea. Lastly, the principle of linearity is also applied in western Europe and is mostly to do with economic and to a greater extent military considerations that force neighboring countries to form linear and thus easy-to-defend borderlines as exemplified by the Franco-Belgian border.

The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) was first introduced in 2003 “Wider Europe” communication by the European Commission and then launched in 2004 as a response to the eastward and southward enlargements of 2004 and 2007. “The Policy was set as a framework to govern the EU’s relations with 16 of the EU’s Eastern and Southern Neighbours in order to achieve the closest possible political association and the greatest possible degree of economic integration” (EU External Action Service, 2016). In other words, the purpose of this policy was to bring these countries closer together as part of EU integration through further cooperation in areas of economics, commerce, diplomacy and politics. In May 2009, the Eastern Partnership (EaP) was launched in terms of the eastern flank of the ENP, and it was meant to be complementary to the ENP goals. Eastern European EU members such as Poland and the Czech Republic are the most prominent proponents of the EaP, since their approach is geopolitically motivated in the face of the Russian threat with regard to Eastern Europe. Poland emerges here as the “main shaper behind the EaP initiative” and “geopolitical thinking has been central to Poland’s investment in EU Eastern policies…” (Cadier, 2019: 81). In Poland’s opinion, the Eastern neighborhood under the influence of the EU is considered a bulwark against Russian aggression and its imperialistic ambitions. As for the Czech Republic, notwithstanding that geopolitical motivations are not as dominant as in Poland’s case, there are some hawkish Atlanticist circles who think that EaP should be a policy seeking to contain or even roll-back Russia.

The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) was first introduced in 2003 “Wider Europe” communication by the European Commission and then launched in 2004 as a response to the eastward and southward enlargements of 2004 and 2007. “The Policy was set as a framework to govern the EU’s relations with 16 of the EU’s Eastern and Southern Neighbours in order to achieve the closest possible political association and the greatest possible degree of economic integration” (EU External Action Service, 2016). In other words, the purpose of this policy was to bring these countries closer together as part of EU integration through further cooperation in areas of economics, commerce, diplomacy and politics. In May 2009, the Eastern Partnership (EaP) was launched in terms of the eastern flank of the ENP, and it was meant to be complementary to the ENP goals. Eastern European EU members such as Poland and the Czech Republic are the most prominent proponents of the EaP, since their approach is geopolitically motivated in the face of the Russian threat with regard to Eastern Europe. Poland emerges here as the “main shaper behind the EaP initiative” and “geopolitical thinking has been central to Poland’s investment in EU Eastern policies…” (Cadier, 2019: 81). In Poland’s opinion, the Eastern neighborhood under the influence of the EU is considered a bulwark against Russian aggression and its imperialistic ambitions. As for the Czech Republic, notwithstanding that geopolitical motivations are not as dominant as in Poland’s case, there are some hawkish Atlanticist circles who think that EaP should be a policy seeking to contain or even roll-back Russia.

Indeed both the major powers of Europe such as Russia, France and Italy, and smaller states experienced this unprecedented return of geopolitics in their foreign affairs thinking and practice. Many books and other studies on geopolitics have been published in a wide range of European languages, while the term has widely appeared in newspapers and periodicals across Europe

Another highly criticized aspect of the ENP is the lack of political will on the part of EU member states to cope with authoritarian regimes in neighboring areas for the sake of both stability and the prevention of irregular migration towards Europe. In other words, the EU has remained too soft on the issue of democratization in its vicinity, and this in return has caused a serious backlash for the EU in the form of the return of security threats such as terrorism which it is not ready to fight, given its emphasis on soft-power tools. During the Arab Spring revolts, then, the EU lost its relevance as a democratizing force for the Arab protestors because of its weak commitment to the wave of democratization in the Arab world. Finally, the economic crisis hit the EU severely, and dealt a severe blow in terms of its reliability and credibility for neighboring regions. In addition to the Middle East, the EU has also softened its rigid conditionality in Eastern Europe, as proven by its attempt to convince Ukraine under the Yanukovych government to sign the Association Agreement, which was dubbed as a “bulwark against Russian aggression”, while lifting sanctions on Belarus in 2016, which were imposed because of its poor democracy and human rights record.

Brazil’s response to the Pacific Alliance was the launch of the Integration of Regional Infrastructures project, which also reflected Brasília’s recognition of the significance of the Pacific region and its quest to connect the Atlantic and Pacific (Nolte and Wehner, 2015: 38; Lowenthal and Baron, 2014: 32). The growing trans-Pacific trade ushered in an enhanced prominence of the Panama Canal, the proposals for the creation of the Nicaragua Canal as well as the rising strategic importance of Pacific-facing countries, such as Peru and Chile, to Brazil.

In 2012, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru launched the Pacific Alliance, which primarily seeks to expand free trade between these countries. Except for the Pacific Alliance, all of these regional integration schemes sought to isolate the US and Canada from participating in the new regional institutions.

The Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) was created through the signing of the Treaty of Asuncion in 1991 between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay to design a South American common market.

The Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) was created through the signing of the Treaty of Asuncion in 1991 between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay to design a South American common market.

It is crucial to highlight five defining processes that have been shaping the new geopolitical scenario in the Western Hemisphere:

• Declining of the US power in the Americas

• Latin American governments’ enhanced autonomy in regional and global affairs

• The resurgence of the left and post-hegemonic regionalism

• Emergence of regional leaders to fill the void left by the US (Brazil and Venezuela)

• China’s rise and global multipolarity

• Commodity boom

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is a free trade agreement created in 1994 by Canada, Mexico and the United States.

The Andean Community is a trade bloc created by Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela in 1996.

UNASUR and the SDC sought to enhance regional security cooperation and produce public security goods as well as designing and implementing policies such as conflict mediation. Brazil’s regional security policy also reflected the principles of consensual hegemony. Rather than providing material security goods through military spending, Brazil’s regional leadership in the security realm had a robust ideational dimension. Geopolitically, Brasília aimed to reinforce a regional security identity to prevent external interference from Europe and North America (Burges, 2017: 175). On many occasions, Brazil expressed in words its support for the protection of norms such as democracy and sovereignty in the region, which constituted the main foundations of the security concept that it advocated. Brazil’s direct interventions in the Ecuadorian–Peruvian War in 1995 and the Haitian crisis in 2004 constituted exceptional cases. Brazil only intervened when it perceived that the arbitration was necessary to maintain its stature as a regional power and an important global actor (Burges, 2008: 79). As the regional integration process deepened, UNASUR appeared as the major conflict mediator and crisis manager under the leadership of Brazil, thereby replacing the role of the OAS. The South American region witnessed UNASUR’s successful efforts in managing the Bolivian crisis (2008) and mediating the dispute between Colombia and Venezuela (2010) (Nolte and Wehner, 2012: 10–11; Sanahuja, 2017). UNASUR and the SDC thus reflected autonomist strategies aimed at counterbalancing the US’s power in the Western Hemisphere. Similarly, these institutions constituted an alternative to the OAS, which was primarily driven by US preferences, and thus challenged the US’s primacy in shaping the region’s security agenda (Nolte and Wehner, 2012).

As the second-largest economy in the world, China’s engagement with the Latin American region over the last two decades has had important implications for the region and its relations with the US. China recently expanded its trade, military and investment ties with the region, fuelled by its commodity demand, in order to expand its own industrialisation (Ellis, 2016: 291). China’s trade volume with Latin America increased from 12 billion USD in 2000 to 260 billion USD in 2013. Chinese loans reached 37 billion USD in 2010 and decreased to 29 billion in 2015, whereas they had remained under 1 billion USD until 2008 (Piccone, 2016: 3). China displaced the US as the main trade partner of Brazil, Chile and Peru. The share of Latin American imports from the US out of its total imports saw a decline from 50 percent in 2000 to 33 percent in 2016. China’s share in Latin American imports increased from 3 percent to 18 percent in this period (Oppenheimer, 2017). From 2000 onward, Chinese presidents Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping made several visits to Latin American countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Mexico and Venezuela. In these visits, China’s aim was to enhance cooperation with the region in various areas, such as energy, trade, infrastructure, finance, technology and the military, based on South–South Cooperation and mutual respect for national sovereignty (Ellis, 2016: 296; Piccone, 2016).

From the mid-1990s onward, Brazil started to view South America as part of its sphere of influence, and also sought to enhance its role in the Caribbean region (Serbin, 2014:71; Flemes, 2009). In Central America, Brazil did not exert much power where it faced substantial competition from Mexico (Burges, 2017: 198–199). In contrast to the Latin American identity, the idea of a distinct South America was a recent creation. During the mid-1990s, Brazilian president F. H. Cardoso (1995–2002) promoted a South American regional identity with its separate geopolitical agenda. Later president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–2011) prioritised the achievement of prosperity and stability in the sub-region as a primary foreign policy goal. Brazil views Argentina as its main partner in deepening the South American integration project (Flemes, 2009: 167; Burges, 2017: 199–200). Labelled by Burges (2008; 2015), the idea of “consensual hegemony” (later “cooperative hegemony”) was the result of Brazil’s search for a new position in a changing global order: a unipolar world order after the Cold War, globalisation and US detachment from the region. In the past, Brazil had followed different strategies to insert itself into the international system, such as Third-Worldism or siding with the US. In the new scenario, Brazil’s response was to recast its identity as a sub-regional consensual hegemony by forging the construction of an autonomous, integrated South America (Burges, 2008: 74). The Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff (2011–2016) governments also focused on Africa and the Global South, expanding Cardoso’s geopolitical imagination beyond the Americas (Burges, 2017). These leaders crafted regional institutions (MERCOSUR and UNASUR) and participated actively in extra-regional alliances (BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa; IBSA – with India and South Africa; and the G20 for trade) in an effort to enhance regional autonomy, reform global governance and counterbalance the US hegemony (Serbin, 2014; Williams, 2012).