JEOPOLİTİK STRATEJİ - Deneme Sınavı - 8

The un derlying idea here was to prevent the Soviet Union from imposing its ideology on other countries and thus providing economic and military assistance to developing countries could be the main part of the containment policy.

Huntington draws a new world map populated by eight major civilizations, which include Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, SlavicOrthodox, Latin American and possibly African civilization.

In this respect, geostrategy consists both political and geographical elements. Elements of geostrategy can be divided into two categories as spatial and conjunctural elements. The space includes land and sea and the conjunctural elements include demography, resources and socio-political elements.

The first sign of the US’s Eurasian geostrategy can be found in NATO’s enlargement process.

In this sense, Brzezinski defined Turkey as a geopolitical pivot, which means “a state whose importance is derived not from its power but rather from its sensitive location and from the consequences of its potentially vulnerable condition for the behavior of geostrategic players”.

The end of the Cold War opened up a new phase in geo-economic thinking. In 1990, in a seminal article, Luttwak who used the term for the first time, asserted that in the post-Cold War world the main arena for rivalry amongst states would be economic rather than military.

Bombing a factory for example is not geo-economics since bombs are not economic means.

The world economy that is capitalism in Wallerstein’s understanding and liberalism as its ideological premise formed the geo-culture of the world system.

Geopolitics tries to examine the relationship between geography and politics and ascertains the impact of geographical location and characteristics of states on the interplay of international political competition among them. Throughout history there have occurred different understandings of geopolitics and it is not easy to agree on a common definition of geopolitical thought in the literature (O Tauthail, Dalby, Routledge, 2003). Geopolitics as a unique academic discipline has also close links to International Relations, Security Studies and Strategic Studies. All these academic disciplines share the view that international politics is first and foremost a struggle for power among sovereign nation states. Another close relationship exists between geopolitics and geo-economics. Differentiating between the use of geography for political goals and economic goals is not an easy exercise to do because political and economic motivations of states are very much intermingled with each other. The best example to offer in this regard is China’s One-Road-One-Belt Initiative. The goals of power and wealth maximizations closely relate to each other and most of the time the road to further political power goes through economic power.

What lies at the roots of geopolitical thinking is the never-ending process of attributing an overarching meaning to physical geography (O Tauthail and Dalby, 2002). The way how physical geography is defined requires at the outset a discursive effort. The impact of geography on politics cannot be solely studied in a positivist fashion because statesmen and people who are interested in geopolitics tend to interpret the impact of physical characteristics of geography on politics through their subjective understandings. This suggests that geopolitics as an academic field can best be analyzed through the techniques of critical epistemology and methodology. The meaning of geopolitics at times when geographical location and physical terrain were too important in the quest of states to maximize their political and economic power was quite different than the meaning of geopolitics at times when technological developments inthe realms of military industry, communication, transportation and information have gradually rendered the mere physical location meaningless in international politics. Since the second half of the nineteenth century till now, the meaning of geopolitics, particularly in regards to what kind of a relationship exists between geography and politics, has varied tremendously.

As also understood from the information given, the answer is E. All of the statements in the options related to geopolitics are correct.

Since the second half of the nineteenth century till the onset of the Cold War era, geopolitics was mainly an imperial exercise undertaken by great powers. Mackinder, a geographer in the United Kingdom, is considered to be the first important geopolitical thinker. His heartland theory assumes that the particular power that controls the Eurasian landmass would eventually control the global politics and master the universe. In his characterization, land powers are more likely to lay claim to regional and global hegemony than maritime powers. From this perspective all great powers of the time were in a geopolitical competition to ensure that their rivals do not possess full control of the Eurasian landmass. His thoughts seem to have had great impact on Anglo-Saxon geopolitical tradition in that both the British empire during the age of Pax-Britanica and the United States during the age of Pax-Americana spent a good deal of effort to prevent any particular European or Asian country from dominating the Eurasian heartland.

As also understood from the information given, the answer is E. All of the statements in the options related to geopolitics in early stages.

Unlike Mackinder, Alfred Mahan, a military historian in the United States, argued that the road to global primacy in international politics would go through mastering oceans and other sea lines. He recommended that the leaders of the United States follow in the footsteps of the British Empire to build up a massive naval force if they want to become the most powerful country on earth. Controlling international trade routes at sea would require huge investments in bluewater navy as well as the United States establishing military bases in vital choke points. In Mahan’s thinking, controlling sea traffic through a powerful navy would absolve the United States of taking direct control of other countries. To him, the United States should avoid transforming other nations in the image of American values and stay away from nation-building exercises in far distant places. The United States is already safe because of its territorial location. The two oceans to its east and west and two weak neighbors to its north and south provide Americans with a high degree of security compared to the nationals of many other countries. Therefore, the American decision makers would do well to invest in navy rather than army. Mahan was of the view that Hamiltonianism would serve American global interests better than other strategies. The best the US should do was to become a role model for others and engage in international trade. If push comes to shove the powerful American navy would protect the American populace and American trade interests across the globe.

As also understood from the information given, the answer is E. All of the statements in the options related to Alfred Mahan are correct.

Geopolitics in its early stages was closely associated with Germany’s foreign policy practices, a latecomer in the struggle for building colonial empires across the globe (Dodds, 2007). Friedrich Ratzel and Karl Haushofer are the most notable German geopolitical thinkers and their thoughts on geopolitics profoundly shaped foreign policies of Nazi Germany during the interwar years and Second World War. The impact of their thought on Nazi Germany’s policies was so decisive and pernicious that geopolitics had been for a long time associated with Hitler’s Germany and considered to be an intellectual exercise serving Hitler’s goals to institute German hegemony across the globe. Rather than geopolitics being recognized as a respectable field of academic study, even the word of geopolitics was avoided in writings on international relations. Hitler’s policies gave a bad reputation to geopolitics. It took some time to recognize geopolitics as a distinct academic discipline.

To Ratzel and Houshofer, states are like living organisms that require lebensraum, viz. living spaces, to survive in the anarchical international environment. Just as individuals require a healthy body and mental condition, states are also in need of fertile and defensible physical terrain as well as robust and uncontaminated people to survive in international politics. Darwin’s survival of the fittest characterization of interpersonal relations would apply to interstate relations quite well. Hitler carried such thoughts one step further in arguing that the German/Arian race is superior to all other races and its purity needs to be ensured through the elimination of Jews, transsexuals and gypsies from the German nation. Hitler’s geopolitical thinking was also informed by the idea that all ethnic Germans should be brought together under the rule of German state. Such thinking on the part of Hitler’s Nazi government pushed Germany to invade neighboring countries one by one and then organize a massive attack against the Soviet Union during the Second World War. The concentration camps constructed by Nazi Germany across Europe were used to undertake a massive genocide against Jews.

As also understood from the information given, the answer is E. All of the statements in the options related to geopolitics in early stages are correct.

The second generation of geopolitical studies came to the fore following the end of the Second World War. Throughout the long Cold war years, the US-led Western camp was in bitter ideological competition with the Soviet Union-led eastern camp. The major faultiness between the two opposing power blocks was ideological. The parties competed with each other as to whose political-economic model would triumph across the globe. Ideology and identity were the main signifiers of their geopolitical competition. This era in geopolitical studies is also called ideological geopolitics (Gray and Sloan, 2013).

As also understood from the information given, the answer is E. All of the statements in the options related to second generation of geopolitical studies are correct.

There was a rivalry between the two camps over the so-called Third World. At stake was to ensure the countries that were considered to be part of the Third World should not join the opposing side. Third world countries also constituted the playing ground between the two camps. Rather than facing off each other directly, they both preferred to score goals against each other through their proxies in the Third World countries. In many of the internal power struggles in Third World countries the United States and the Soviet Union supported different fractions. Critical decisions on offering military aid, assisting economic development and providing territorial security were usually taken with ideological considerations in the background.

The second generation of geopolitical studies came to the fore following the end of the Second World War. Throughout the long Cold war years, the US-led Western camp was in bitter ideological competition with the Soviet Union-led eastern camp. The major faultiness between the two opposing power blocks was ideological. The parties competed with each other as to whose political-economic model would triumph across the globe. Ideology and identity were the main signifiers of their geopolitical competition. This era in geopolitical studies is also called ideological geopolitics

The camps in this competition in the ideological geopolitics era were the liberal-democratic capitalist western countries and authoritarian communist eastern countries. In the middle were the so-called Third World countries. The way how each camp approached the issues of armament, development, industrialization, human rights and security was profoundly influenced by their ideological positions. For example, the containment policy that was initially put into existence by the US-led western camp in order to prevent the Soviet Union from physically dominating particular geographical locations reflected ideational motivations in the background. At stake was not only containing the physicalSoviet penetration into some geographical locations but also ensuring that Soviet ideology did not enlarge to those locations. Geographical regions were attributed identity related ideological meanings. To be a part of the west meant not only having military cooperation with the United States multilaterally or bilaterally but also subscribing to the constitutive norms of the western international society. Ideological lenses dominated how statesmen in both camps approached geopolitics. There was a rivalry between the two camps over the so-called Third World. At stake was to ensure the countries that were considered to be part of the Third World should not join the opposing side. Third world countries also constituted the playing ground between the two camps. Rather than facing off each other directly, they both preferred to score goals against each other through their proxies in the Third World countries. In many of the internal power struggles in Third World countries the United States and the Soviet Union supported different fractions. Critical decisions on offering military aid, assisting economic development and providing territorial security were usually taken with ideological considerations in the background.

As also understood from the information given, the answer is E. All of the statements in the options related to ideological geopolitcs are correct.

During the Cold War era, both the United States and the Soviet Union did their best to increase the number of countries adopting their political ideologies. Their goal was to help enlarge their ideological sphere of influence. A more recent example of ideological geopolitics has taken place over the last decade when the illiberal authoritarian model of China and Russia appears to have dented the image of liberal democracy in the West. Even though the emerging geopolitical rivalry between today’s United States and China can in no way be compared to the ideological rivalry between the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War era, it would not be wrong to argue that the emerging geopolitical competition between Beijing and Washington does also demonstrate diverging normative understandings of political and economic values. A growing number of analysts and observers point out that the United States would do well to help bring into existence a league of liberal democracies if she wanted to contain the rise of China in global politics. It is not a coincidence that all the major powers in Asia that feel themselves threatened by China’s rise are democracies. The members of Quad are all democracies in different shades.

From a similar perspective, China and Russia have been supporting particular political parties and movements across the world that all appear to hold extremely critical views on multiculturalism, immigration, multilateralism and liberal democracy. Today’s Russia and China appear to excel in authoritarianism and state-led capitalism. Even though Trump’s America is fast moving in the direction of illiberal democracy, it would not be wrong to argue that the escalating geopolitical competition between the United States on the one hand and China and Russia on the other demonstrates strong ideological characteristics. After all what is at stake in this emerging rivalry is whether the liberal-democratic capitalist model will defeat the illiberal authoritarian model in the quest for economic development and political maturation.

As also understood from the information given, the answer is E. All of the statements in the options related to geopolitics during the Cold War era are correct.

Third generation geopolitics began with the end of the Cold War rivalry between two opposing power blocks adopting diverging political ideologies. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the unification of Germany in 1990 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 epitomized the end of ideological geopolitics. Since the early 1990s till the end of the first decade of the twenty first century, analysts observed the rise of a new geopolitical understanding being defined by many as a new world order. New world order geopolitics suggested that there was only one super power all over the world and all other states would gain influence in international politics in relation to the status of their relationship with the global hegemon. That sole superpower happened to be the United States. There was a huge power gap between the United States and all other countries and it was nearly impossible for any country, acting alone or in cooperation with others, to counterbalance the American hegemony. Hence, bandwagoning appears to have replaced balancing in the age American primacy in global politics.

As also understood from the informaation given, the answer is E. All of the statements in the options related to third generation geopoltics are correct.

The extreme self-confidence on the part of the American statesmen led them to argue that the United States is the indispensable nation and there is no need to help bring into existence new regional or global security organizations that would potentially replace NATO. It was in accordance with such thinking that whenever the Russian leadership offered the idea that a new pan-European security organization should be founded replacing western-dominated ones, the Americans simply ignored them.

A cardinal characteristic of the third generation geopolitics was that the possibility of any great power war would be almost zero because it was assumed that all great powers would pay an utmost care to get along with the United States well. Just because none of the great powers was in a position to challenge the American preeminence and lay claim to hegemony in its own region, the best thing to do on their side would be bandwagoning with the sole superpower.

Looking from this perspective, armed conflicts would rather take place within states. Intrastate wars, viz. civil wars, would replace interstate wars. The wars in the Balkans and the Caucasus during the 1990s demonstrated that the major threats to regional and global security would stem from internal conflicts rather than interstate power competitions. During this time period many states across the globe, saving the United States, decreased their military spending in proportion to their Cold War era spending and armies went through a transformation process thereby their peacekeeping and peacemaking capabilities improved.

This time period also attested to the heyday of the European Union integration process. The EU both enlarged horizontally and deepened vertically. Many countries around the globe looked to the European Union integration process as the ideal example to emulate. EU appeared to be a successful role model for other countries across the globe. New world order geopolitics suggested that American hegemony would keep the peace in the world and other countries would be able to devote much more energy and capital to their economic development and political maturation in line with liberal democratic capitalist values.

As also understood from the information given, the answer is E. All of the statements above related to third generation of geopolitics are correct.

Fourth Generation of Geopolitcs

Even though the 9/11 attacks on the US homeland dented the image of the United States as the omnipotent global hegemon and criticisms of the American approach to the global war on terror intensified following the US occupation of Iraq, it was primarily following the financial crisis of the late 2000s that a sense of decline began to percolate down to the western elites in the United States and EU members.

After the 9/11 Attacks

Not only has the feeling of optimism eroded but also the specter of non-western powers challenging the primacy of western powers has begun to haunt many westerners. As the Russian resurgence and Chinese revival took root, the calls for accommodating rising non-western powers in the institutional structure of the liberal international order began to be heard more loudly (Guzzini, 2012). The revised security strategy of the European Union (issued in the summer of the 2016), and the first national security strategy of the Trump administration (issued in December 2017) demonstrate that western powers feel threatened by the rise of non-western powers. Both documents suggest some ways to deal with the resurgence of traditional security concerns as well as the worldwide emergence of illiberal authoritarianism. Since 2008 there have been disputes all over the world over the values of multiculturalism, openness, tolerance, and universal human rights. The morality of universal cosmopolitanism has gradually given way to the morality of relative communitarianism as rising non-western powers, primarily China and Russia, have increasingly offered non-western conceptualizations of international political order. Non-interference in states’ internal affairs, primacy of state sovereignty, authoritarian leadership, the strengthening of national identities, state-led capitalism, spheres of influence mentality, multi-polarism in global governance, primacy of great powers in international relations, mercantilist trade practices, investment in military power capabilities, an increased use of economic power instruments in the name of securing geopolitical gains, and the questioning of the principle ‘responsibility to protect’ are some of the points that Russian and Chinese leaderships have been vehemently prioritizing over the last decade. This does not, however, suggest that countries like China have not benefited from the liberal international order, particularly in the field of economics. Yet, China’s gains from the liberal-capitalist global order have mainly emanated from western sponsorship, rather than from China acting as a convicted disciple. So long as the western powers, particularly the United States, assumed that China would turn out to become a responsible stakeholder and gradually transform into a liberal democratic polity, they tolerated China’s rise and its inappropriate trade practices and non-democratic political values. The West was able to endure some economic losses relative to emerging powers, so long as it had self-confidence. The western powers have not been immune to such currents either. The last decade has witnessed the rise of populist and illiberal political movements in key western countries. The internal criticism of liberal democratic practices has severely affected the attractiveness of a liberal world order. As the Brexit decision in the United Kingdom and the election of Donald Trump to presidency in the United States demonstrate, the forces of illiberalism, populism, protectionism, and xenophobia have gained ground in key western countries. Parallel to the shift in material power capabilities across the globe and the growing challenges posed to the normative foundation of the liberal international order, realpolitik foreign policy practices and pragmatic concerns in defining national interests have become more pronounced than moralpolitik practices and normative concerns (Nye, 2015). Power politics and ‘sphere of influence’ mentality have experienced a revival over the last decade. As geo-economic and geopolitical motivations have become more decisive in states’ foreign policies, the dynamics of alliance relationships have also gone through a radical transformation. During the last decade, long-term identity based alliance relationships have been replaced with short-term, pragmatic, and issueoriented strategic partnerships. The practice of forming interest-oriented cooperation initiatives within multilateral and bilateral frameworks has gained ground in recent years. In today’s world, countries of different value orientations, geographical locations, power capabilities, and threat perceptions are no longer bound to define each other categorically as enemies or friends. The notion of ‘frenemy’ has already become an identity signifier in interstate relations. The practice of coalitions defining missions has gradually given way to the practice of missions defining coalitions. As opposed to Cold War bipolarity and the unipolar order during the first two decades of the post-Cold War era, the practice of illiberal authoritarian states engaging in pragmatic outcome-oriented cooperation with liberal-minded states is now conceivable.

As also understood from the information given, the answer is E. All of the statements in the options related to fourth generation of geopolitics are correct.

In today’s international order, the ideological polarization of opposing power blocks is not as sharp and rigid as it was during the Cold War era. The interconnectedness between liberal western powers and illiberal authoritarian powers is much higher now than it was between western capitalist and eastern communist countries during the Cold war era. This suggests that we now live in a multiplex world order. Not only are there more actors in international relations but also issues have become so complex that dealing with them increasingly requires global perspectives. This world order leads states with various power capabilities to adopt multidimensional and multidirectional foreign policy strategies.

Even though the debate on the decline of the West still lingers and many question the idea of declinizm in the United States, it is now clear that the United States under Trump’s presidency no longer wants to play the leader of the liberal international order. This creates enough room for non-western rising powers to act more assertively and become more visible across the globe.

As also understood from the information given, the answer is E. All of the statements in the options related to fourth generation geopolitics are correct.

Critical Geopolitics

The word ‘geopolitics’ consists of two different words. ‘Geo’ is the abbreviation of geography. Politics means deciding who gets what, how and when. Geography consists of two words, geo and graphy. Geo means earth and graphy means writing. Geopolitics means the politics of writing the earth. The fundamental claim of critical geopolitical studies is that all kinds of geopolitical understandings are subjective and reflect particular values and previously conceived national interests. There is not an objective scientific understanding of geopolitics as claimed by first generation geopolitical writers. Naming particular physical locations as they are and attributing meanings to geographical locations are all political exercises in the background. There is not a bird-view of geopolitics which is claimed to be timeless and ahistorical.

Geopolitics and Power Relations

From the perspective of critical geopolitics, meanings attributed to particular geographical locations emanate from deeply held political interests and subjective understandings of identity (O Tuathail, 1996). Power relations determine purchasing value of geopolitical understandings. Throughout history different meanings have been attributed to geographical sites. The question to be asked, from the perspective of critical geopolitics, should be which political interests are cloaked under particular geopolitical conceptualizations at different times. Identifying a physical place on earth with particular national interests, identities, ideologies or civilizations is in fact a political exercise. The question of whose geopolitical imagination will prevail in the final analysis will be profoundly determined by the distribution of power capabilities within the international system. All claims to objective geopolitical analyses in fact mask particular political motivations and interests (Ingram and Dodds, 2009). To give an example, one can underline the fact that many people in the world today call the place Middle East as Middle East without thinking any moment why this region is called Middle East. Which actors first depicted this region as such and for which particular purposes? Critical geopolitics as a subfield of geopolitics tries to uncover hidden political purposes and motivations lying behind allegedly objective and neutral geopolitical observations. From the perspective of critical geopolitics, there are no objective geopolitical claims. All such claims are for someone and for some purposes.

As also understood from the information given, the answer is E. All of the statements in the options related to critical geopolitics are correct.