INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

These basic elements—the self-interested actor, competition among producers, and a relatively unregulated market—are the hallmarks of neoclassical economic thought and central to rational choice theory.

Recent advances in behavioral economics, experimental economics, social psychology, and psychology are redefining the ways in which public administration scholars view the contribution of rational choice to these areas, and more generally are changing the way scholars theorize about utility.

Building from the assumption of rational self-interest, Downs argued that a set of behavioral biases should be common to all bureaucrats: (1) Like Tullock, Downs (1967, 77) argued that bureaucrats will be motivated to distort information as it passes upward in the hierarchy to reflect favorably on themselves and their individual goals. (2) Bureaucrats will favor policies that fi t with their own interests and goals. (3) How bureaucrats react to directives from superiors will depend on how those directives serve the bureaucrats’ self-interest. If the directives favor individual interests, the degree of compliance will be high; if not, it will be low. (4) Individual goals will determine the extent to which bureaucrats seek out responsibility and also determine their risk tolerance in pursuit of responsibility and power.

In Downs’s classification (1967, 92), “climbers” are bureaucrats who want to maximize their power, income, or prestige. Climbers are likely to pursue responsibility aggressively, especially in the sense of creating new functions for their agencies. In contrast, “conservers” are bureaucrats who want to maximize security and convenience, and they will more likely defend existing prerogatives and functions rather than try to invent new ones.

If Niskanen is correct, these worthy motives will cumulatively account for little because no one bureaucrat has the necessary information to divine the public interest.

Niskanen’s self-interested bureaucrat engages in predictable behavioral patterns; she will maximize salary when possible, shirk work in the absence of monitoring, and reliably respond in the face of financial incentives. Recent empirical evidence suggests that, even though bureaucrats are predictable, their behavior is not rational in the neoclassical economic sense.

Recent empirical evidence shows that perceptions of a leader’s characteristics influence whether a follower will engage in a particular behavior. Followers that attribute competence and trustworthiness to leaders are not only more likely to follow authoritative requests but are also more likely to engage in risky behavior on behalf of leaders/managers and are less likely to perceive a need to break the rules or “sabotage” the organization. Moreover, employees are more likely to identify with their organization and engage in voluntary compliance with organizational norms when they trust their superiors.

The critics of rational choice argue that its starting assumptions are too narrow and unreasonably downplay the possibility that bureaucrats might seek to maximize the public interest, professional or ethical norms, or a variety of group-based motivations that threaten methodological individualism.

Implied by the Tiebout model are that citizens in fragmented government settings will be more informed about public services than those in centralized government settings; will be more likely to exit if they are dissatisfied with those services; and, given that they can make choices about tax-service packages, will be more satisfied with the services they do receive.

Advocates of rational choice argue that, if constructed with care, something approaching a competitive market for public services can be created that will produce benefits for all. The competitive pressures of the market can provide public agencies with the incentives to be responsive to consumer-citizen preferences and to become efficient producers of public goods. The rest are arguments of the opponents.

Weber said that a democratic administration would have four characteristics. (1) Everyone is assumed to be qualified to participate in the conduct of public affairs. All citizens, not just technocrats, are assumed to have the necessary expertise to become involved in deciding what policies to pursue and how to pursue them. (2) Important decisions are opened up to all members of a community and their elected representatives. (3) Power is broadly diffused, not concentrated in a dominant center. (4) Administrative functionaries are public servants, not a technocratic elite of “public masters.” Under these conditions, a democratic administration will be concentrated by polycentric government—one with multiple power.