INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

The intellectual roots of rational choice date back at least to the work of Adam Smith, whose The Wealth of Nations (first published in 1976) is the intellectual rock on which neoclassical economic theory is constructed.

With Anthony Downs’s An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957), and James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock’s The Calculus of Consent (1962), the implications of economic theory for the public sector could be ignored no longer.

Smith’s great insight was that people acting in pursuit of their own selfinterest could, through the mechanism of the “invisible hand,” produce collective benefits that profited all society. These basic elements—the self-interested actor, competition among producers, and a relatively unregulated market—are the hallmarks of neo- classical economic thought and central to rational choice theory.

The average individual is a self-interested utility maximizer. This means an individual knows her preferences or goals, can rank-order them, and when faced with a set of options to achieve those preferences will choose those expected to maximize individual benefits and minimize individual costs.

Only individuals, not collectives, make decisions. This is known as methodological individualism, and it presumes that collective decisions are aggregations of individual choices, not a unique property of the group.

Rather than concentrate on career advancement, Downs sought to accommodate a wider variety of individual goals in conceptualizing the motivations of the self-interested bureaucrat, and systematically ordered these goals into a typology of bureaucratic personalities. In Downs’s classification, “climbers” are bureaucrats who want to maximize their power, income, or prestige. In contrast, “conservers” are bureaucrats who want to maximize security and convenience, and they will more likely defend existing prerogatives and functions rather than try to invent new ones. “Zealots” are bureaucrats motivated to pursue particular policies, even in the face of overwhelming obstacles. Other categories included “advocates,” who, like zealots, aggressively pursue favored policies but are more open to influence from peers and superiors, and “statesmen,” bureaucrats seeking to promote the public interest through the promotion of broad policy goals.

Rather than concentrate on career advancement, Downs sought to accommodate a wider variety of individual goals in conceptualizing the motivations of the self-interested bureaucrat, and systematically ordered these goals into a typology of bureaucratic personalities. In Downs’s classification, “climbers” are bureaucrats who want to maximize their power, income, or prestige. In contrast, “conservers” are bureaucrats who want to maximize security and convenience, and they will more likely defend existing prerogatives and functions rather than try to invent new ones. “Zealots” are bureaucrats motivated to pursue particular policies, even in the face of overwhelming obstacles. Other categories included “advocates,” who, like zealots, aggressively pursue favored policies but are more open to influence from peers and superiors, and “statesmen,” bureaucrats seeking to promote the public interest through the promotion of broad policy goals.

Rather than concentrate on career advancement, Downs sought to accommodate a wider variety of individual goals in conceptualizing the motivations of the self-interested bureaucrat, and systematically ordered these goals into a typology of bureaucratic personalities. In Downs’s classification, “climbers” are bureaucrats who want to maximize their power, income, or prestige. In contrast, “conservers” are bureaucrats who want to maximize security and convenience, and they will more likely defend existing prerogatives and functions rather than try to invent new ones. “Zealots” are bureaucrats motivated to pursue particular policies, even in the face of overwhelming obstacles. Other categories included “advocates,” who, like zealots, aggressively pursue favored policies but are more open to influence from peers and superiors, and “statesmen,” bureaucrats seeking to promote the public interest through the promotion of broad policy goals.

Rather than concentrate on career advancement, Downs sought to accommodate a wider variety of individual goals in conceptualizing the motivations of the self-interested bureaucrat, and systematically ordered these goals into a typology of bureaucratic personalities. In Downs’s classification, “climbers” are bureaucrats who want to maximize their power, income, or prestige. In contrast, “conservers” are bureaucrats who want to maximize security and convenience, and they will more likely defend existing prerogatives and functions rather than try to invent new ones. “Zealots” are bureaucrats motivated to pursue particular policies, even in the face of overwhelming obstacles. Other categories included “advocates,” who, like zealots, aggressively pursue favored policies but are more open to influence from peers and superiors, and “statesmen,” bureaucrats seeking to promote the public interest through the promotion of broad policy goals.

Rather than concentrate on career advancement, Downs sought to accommodate a wider variety of individual goals in conceptualizing the motivations of the self-interested bureaucrat, and systematically ordered these goals into a typology of bureaucratic personalities. In Downs’s classification, “climbers” are bureaucrats who want to maximize their power, income, or prestige. In contrast, “conservers” are bureaucrats who want to maximize security and convenience, and they will more likely defend existing prerogatives and functions rather than try to invent new ones. “Zealots” are bureaucrats motivated to pursue particular policies, even in the face of overwhelming obstacles. Other categories included “advocates,” who, like zealots, aggressively pursue favored policies but are more open to influence from peers and superiors, and “statesmen,” bureaucrats seeking to promote the public interest through the promotion of broad policy goals.

The intellectual roots of rational choice date back at least to the work of Adam Smith, whose The Wealth of Nations (first published in 1976) is the intellectual rock on which neoclassical economic theory is constructed. Smith’s great insight was that people acting in pursuit of their own self-interest could, through the mechanism of the “invisible hand,” produce collective benefits that profited all society. These basic elements—the self-interested actor, competition among producers, and a relatively unregulated market—are the hallmarks of neo- classical economic thought and central to rational choice theory. The answer is D.

Anthony Downs wrote the book  An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957).The answer is A.

Tullock sought to explain what a bureaucracy would look like if bureaucrats were self-interested utility maximizers. He argued that a rational, self-interested bureaucrat maximizes utility through career advancement, and that advancement in the merit-based systems of public bureaucracies often depends upon the favorable recommendations of superiors. If this is so, Tullock reasoned, the rational bureaucrat will seek to please superiors and put himself in as favorable a light as possible. Thus, a rational bureaucrat will highlight information that reflects favorably upon himself and repress (perhaps even suppress) information that does not. Distorting information in this way will create a host of problems. The net result is an agency prone to mistakes, difficult to manage, and hard to control.The answer is A .

Rather than concentrate on career advancement, Downs sought to accommodate a wider variety of individual goals in conceptualizing the motivations of the self-interested bureaucrat, and systematically ordered these goals into a typology of bureaucratic personalities. In Downs’s classification, “climbers” are bureaucrats who want to maximize their power, income, or prestige. In contrast, “conservers” are bureaucrats who want to maximize security and convenience, and they will more likely defend existing prerogatives and functions rather than try to invent new ones. “Zealots” are bureaucrats motivated to pursue particular policies, even in the face of overwhelming obstacles. Other categories included “advocates,” who, like zealots, aggressively pursue favored policies but are more open to influence from peers and superiors, and “statesmen,” bureaucrats seeking to promote the public interest through the promotion of broad policy goals. The answer is E. Zealots.

Rather than concentrate on career advancement, Downs sought to accommodate a wider variety of individual goals in conceptualizing the motivations of the self-interested bureaucrat, and systematically ordered these goals into a typology of bureaucratic personalities. In Downs’s classification, “climbers” are bureaucrats who want to maximize their power, income, or prestige. In contrast, “conservers” are bureaucrats who want to maximize security and convenience, and they will more likely defend existing prerogatives and functions rather than try to invent new ones. “Zealots” are bureaucrats motivated to pursue particular policies, even in the face of overwhelming obstacles. Other categories included “advocates,” who, like zealots, aggressively pursue favored policies but are more open to influence from peers and superiors, and “statesmen,” bureaucrats seeking to promote the public interest through the promotion of broad policy goals. The answer is B . Conserves.

It was Niskanen who really thrust rational choice theory into a central role in explaining bureaucratic behavior. Niskanen’s great achievement was to create the first formal economic theory of bureaucratic behavior (i.e., his theory was based on mathematical derivations concerning the utility and productivity functions of bureaucrats and bureaucracies). The answer is A.

The most forceful and best-known articulation of this argument comes from Vincent Ostrom in his book The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration (1973). Ostrom argued that the intellectual foundations of public administration were built upon a set of seven theoretical propositions formulated by Woodrow Wilson. First, there is, and always will be, a dominant center of power in any system of government. Second, the more power is divided, the more irresponsible and difficult to control it becomes. Third, the structure of a constitution determines the composition of central power. Fourth, the process of government can be separated into two parts: determining the will of the state (politics) and executing the will of the state (administration). Fifth, although the institutions and processes of politics vary widely from government to government, all governments share strong structural similarities in administration. Sixth, “good” administration is achieved by the proper hierarchical ordering of a professional public service. Seventh, perfection of “good” administration is a necessary condition for advancement of human welfare. The answer is C.

Ostrom argued that the intellectual foundations of public administration were built upon a set of seven theoretical propositions formulated by Woodrow Wilson. First, there is, and always will be, a dominant center of power in any system of government. Second, the more power is divided, the more irresponsible and difficult to control it becomes. Third, the structure of a constitution determines the composition of central power. Fourth, the process of government can be separated into two parts: determining the will of the state (politics) and executing the will of the state (administration). Fifth, although the institutions and processes of politics vary widely from government to government, all governments share strong structural similarities in administration. Sixth, “good” administration is achieved by the proper hierarchical ordering of a professional public service. and not   

IV. “good” administration is achieved by the dysfunction of  hierarchical ordering of a professional public service. Seventh, perfection of “good” administration is a necessary condition for advancement of human welfare.

Tiebout argued that a competitive market for public services could be created if mobile citizens could shop across local jurisdictions for the package of public services and attendant tax burden that best suited their preferences. If citizen-consumers shopped around for preferred tax-service packages, competitive pressures would force producers—that is, local governments and public agencies—to respond to citizens’ preferences. The result, at least in theory, would be efficiently produced public services that reflected public demand for those services. Tiebout model prescriptively implies the exact opposite of orthodox approaches to supplying public services. The answer is D.

For Ostrom, the key factors are trust, reciprocity, and reputation. Trust and trustworthy reputations create opportunities for cooperation between individuals, cooperation that in turn tends to be reciprocated. A reputation as someone who is untrustworthy causes the breakdown of cooperation and ultimately suboptimal outcomes. The answer is B.