DİPLOMASİ

At its foundation, the U.S. proved to be different from traditional powers in Europe and other continents. The immigrant nature of the American society led the founders of the republic to build their country on the basis of liberal, democratic, and pluralist norms, further enshrining the principles of individual freedom, free entrepreneurship, limited government and checks and balances in the Constitution. In the realm of diplomacy and foreign policy, the rulers of the country long shunned the practices of getting involved in other states’ internal affairs and becoming part of geopolitical competitions in other continents. The geographical location of the country, being walled from other places through two oceans to the east and west, enabled the early generations to focus their attention solely on economic development and political cohesion at home.

Unless other continents, most notably Europe and Asia, came under the domination of an anti- American power block and unless any other global power threatened the U.S. national interests by trying to take a strong presence in America’s near abroad, the U.S. leaders did not show strong enthusiasm to pursue ambitious policies to institutionalize American dominance across the globe. Hence the strong ‘isolationist’ impulse in American diplomatic practices.

The U.S. played a facilitative role in the foundation of the European Union. The assumption was that economic, social, and political integration among western European liberal democratic states would not only bring into existence a strong market for American goods and capital but also help the U.S. contain the existential threat emanating from the Soviet Union more cost-effectively.

Dealing with the challenges arising from resurgent Russia, instability in the Balkans and the growing anarchy in the Middle East and North Africa is first and foremost the responsibility of European allies. What happens in these locations affect Europe more than the U.S. It is now abundantly clear that that the U.S. does not want to channel too much of its attention and capabilities to European and Middle Eastern security challenges. Rather, it would like to see its European allies pay much of the bill in such theatres. With Obama and Trump, the focus on great power relations came back. Dealing with China and Russia now appears to be more important than focusing on humanitarian interventions, counter-terrorism, and democracy promotion exercises.

In the US state apparatus, Department of Defense, Department of State, National Security Council, National Economic Council, Department of Commerce, Department of Treasury, Central Intelligence Organization, and United States Trade Representative do all to aid the President in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy interests. The President is in charge of the execution of foreign policy and acts as the commander in chief during peace and war times.

The EU is by far the most successful example of international institutions aiming at transcending traditional/modern interstate relations through the formation of collective identities and supranational institutions. What seems to set the EU apart from other polities is that the post-modern logic underpinning its integration process has mainly culminated in the formation of a security community among its members as well as the prioritization of multiple interdependencies and soft/normative power instruments in its relations with external actors.

The latest crises engulfing EU members appear to have brought forward the issue of leadership inside the EU. Despite the fact that Germany has come under the limelight in this regard, it is still far from certain that Germany has accepted to rise to this challenge and other members, notably France, have already acquiesced to German leadership inside the union. From a principled point of view, it would be good for the EU to see Germany take on the mantle of leadership and help the Union find its way in the uncharted waters of growing challenges, for Germany seems to be the only power inside the EU having this potential.

China now seems to be the country that has the most potential to help re-structure the dynamics of the liberal world order in the years to come. For long, successive American administrations have tended to believe that China would likely transform into a responsible stakeholder of the western-led liberal world order because China was benefiting from this economically.

China is against the idea of a universal civilization as well as the practices of setting global standards of human rights. No country whatsoever should have the claim to universal truths or values. Therefore, from China’s perspective, the promotion of liberal democracy, or any other political ideology, should be immediately discarded from the vocabulary of foreign policy. Rules, values and norms are relative and products of different time and space configurations. This does not, however, mean that China does not adhere to a certain set of rules, values and norms in its state-society relations and external dealings.

It is believed that Russian society is built on the primacy of patriarchal and communal values instead of self-regarding individualistic morality. Russian society evinces a predisposition to communitarian ethics over individualistic or cosmopolitan ethics. That is to say that the meaning of life of an ordinary Russian emanates from his/her belonging to the larger Russian community in which common societal values take priority over an individual quest for happiness and well-being. This perspective in Russian thinking seems to lay behind the objections to western notions of tolerance and heterogeneity. A completely secular culture in which people of different sex, faith, ethnicity, sexual preferences, and languages are completely equal before the law and the primary role of the state is to ensure this heterogeneity is something unacceptable in Putin’s Russia.