DİPLOMASİ

This discussion can also be boiled down to the debate whether foreign policy is a function of interests or values (Oguzlu, 2013, 39-51). In case interests dominate foreign policy choices and behaviors of actors, states are mainly motivated in their external relations by the concern of maximizing their material power capabilities as well as ensuring their long-term survival. Here, neither internal characteristics at home nor the way how other states are ruled in their domestic affairs has a role in shaping foreign policy. Engaging others and responding to external stimuli is basically a function of the instrumental calculation of how much benefit one could extract from such exercises.

On the other hand, in case values and norms shape foreign policy, the question of ‘who states are’ significantly shapes the questions of ‘what states want and how states behave. Looking at foreign policy from this perspective, state leaders bother to ask how others are ruled in their internal affairs and which values they embrace domestically. Foreign policy mainly targets the internal transformation of other states in the image of the values and norms that one holds at home.

A third group of scholars combines the insights of these two approaches and claims that singling out one set of variables at the negligence of others will not bring us anywhere close to understanding the complexity of the real world. They suggest that scholars had better adopt a more holistic approach in this process. The so-called neo-classical realist approach in International Relations can for example be interpreted as a scholarly attempt at successfully merging the tangible and intangible motivations of states’ foreign policy behaviors (Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro, 2009). Put simply, neoclassical realism posits that making sense of the tangible factors out there is made through the intangible factors that constitute states’ identities and values.

Many middle and small-sized powers are much more preoccupied with their survival. Compared to global powers, their room of maneuvering is limited. Their success in ensuring survival hinges on their ability to play global powers off against each other, viz. external balancing, rather than solely investing in their own material capabilities, viz. internal balancing (Goodby, 2014, 31-39). Their foreign policy behaviors aim primarily at mitigating the negative consequences of global power competitions on their internal stability and external sovereignty. Compared to global powers, middle and small-sized powers find it difficult to pursue value-oriented normative foreign policies mainly because their material power capabilities are limited.

On the other hand, global powers are in a much better position than middle and small-sized powers to ground their foreign policies on the basis of both tangible interests and intangible values. The immense material power capabilities at their disposal empower them in their attempts at shaping the external milieu, rather than merely responding to external stimuli in a reactionary manner. That is also to say that adopting a soft-power oriented foreign policy approach is likely to be the prerogative of strong global powers. Investing in value projection abroad and relying on ‘power of attraction’ in dealing with others indirectly require a good deal of hard power capability. Global powers do not only feel secure in terms of their territorial integrity but also find it easy to parley their immense material power capabilities to value-oriented transformative policies abroad.

Unlike some middle powers and many small-sized powers, global powers have the luxury of helping bring into existence a particular external environment to their liking, as well as making use of the existing power balances within the system to maximize their material power capabilities. Stated somewhat differently, global powers do not only aim at maximizing their power capabilities at the expense of their rivals but also endeavor to midwife a particular external environment that reflects their values and norms (Mearsheimer, 2003).

The immigrant nature of the American society led the founders of the republic to build their country on the basis of liberal, democratic and pluralist norms, further enshrining the principles of individual freedom, free entrepreneur-ship, limited government and checks and balances in the Constitution.

By the time the WW2 came to the end, the U.S. had already become the most powerful global actor ever seen in terms of material power capabilities and the ability to help shape the world in its own image.

Rather than subscribing to the modern understanding of forging international relations on the basis of clear-cut inside-outside distinctions, the success of the EU emanates from its ability to have brought into existence a new understanding thereby its foreign policy takes it legitimacy from the common ‘we’ feeling among members. While the intensity and depth of this feeling is much higher among member states, external actors also feel themselves identified with the EU to different degrees.

The financial crisis that hit western economies in 2008 severely seems to have turned all such western assumptions upside down. The economic crisis in 2008 has not only weakened the specter of the EU to become a global power, both in economic and normative senses, but also made it abundantly clear that the success of the American economic model has been to a significant extent tied to the interdependent economic relations developed with the non-western world, most notably China. The crisis and its aftermath have made it unavoidably clear that the United States is today the most indebted country on earth whereas China the number one creditor country. Besides, majorities across the globe seem to believe that China, the aspiring hegemon, is on the rise whereas the United States, the incumbent hegemon, in terminal decline.

Whereas China deems its phenomenal rise as part of its normalization process, the United States finds in China a strong contender for its global hegemony. While Chinese see their country’s efforts to leave behind the ‘centuries of humiliation’ for good as China’s rightful return to its glorious days, the majority of westerners tend to feel skeptical about the end results of this process. To many Chinese, China had been the cradle of global politics for ages by the time the western European nations eclipsed China in terms of economic output, technological innovations and military capabilities. By the middle of the 19^th century, nearly half of global economic production had originated from China. Therefore, the Chinese believe that their country’s rise in recent decades should not be interpreted as the success story of an ordinary country climbing up the ladder of power. Instead, Chinese share the view that China’s recent successes are manifestations of China’s normalization and returning to world history as a major power (Xiang, 2016, 53-62).

Since President Putin came to power in late 1990s, Russia has witnessed a national revival. Having an imperial legacy in the background and acting as one of the two superpowers of the Cold War era, it is quite natural and understandable that Russia wants to leave the troubled years of the 1990s behind and put a serious claim to global power status in the emerging century. Recently, Russia has come under international limelight once again following its annexation of Crimea into its territory, the support that it gives to the separatist groups in the eastern part of Ukraine and its military involvement in Syria on the side of Assad regime. Hardly a day passes without Russia being criticized by western circles of pursuing aggressive, assertive and neo-imperial policies in its near-abroad. The major criticism directed to Russia is that unlike the post-modern powers of the European Union and the liberal power the United States, Russia acts as a typical realpolitik power which deeply believes in the primacy of material power capabilities, the use of brute military force and commanding spheres of influence in global power politics. Russia is believed to have been acting as a nineteenth century power in the twenty-first century.

Whereas one group of scholars argues that foreign policy behaviors are mainly a function of intangible factors of material power capabilities, geographical locations, and external developments, another group contends that intangible factors of personality traits, belief systems, world views, ideologies and cultures play more decisive roles (Neack, 2014).

Compared to global powers, middle and small-sized powers find it difficult to pursue value-oriented normative foreign policies mainly because their material power capabilities are limited.

Understanding the diplomatic practices of such global powers as the United States (U.S.), European Union (EU), Russia and China help us better comprehend the dynamics of international politics and the future direction of global order.

Making sense of foreign policy and diplomatic practices of the U.S. in the Middle East cannot be properly accomplished without taking into account the ideational/value-oriented logic of democracy promotion.

Pax-Sinica can be said to be a goal China pursues.

The geographical location of the country, being walled from other places through two oceans to the east and west, enabled the early generations to focus their attention solely on economic development and political cohesion at home.

Since the early years of the Cold War era, the U.S. has mainly adopted an ‘internationalist’ mentality and acted as a liberal power putting its liberal democratic norms at the center of its foreign and security policy engagements across the globe (Johnstone, 2011, 13-17).

The assumption was that economic, social and political integration among western European liberal democratic states would not only bring into existence a strong market for American goods and capital but also help the U.S. contain the existential threat emanating from the Soviet Union more cost-effectively.

The success of the EU emanates from its ability to have brought into existence a new understanding thereby its foreign policy takes it legitimacy from the common ‘we’ feeling among members.

It does not construct its foreign relations on the basis of a normative understating in that it is China’s historical and civilizational mission to project its values abroad.