DİPLOMASİ

Whereas one group of scholars argues that foreign policy behaviors are mainly a function of intangible factors of material power capabilities, geographical locations, and external developments, another group contends that intangible factors of personality traits, belief systems, world views, ideologies and cultures play more decisive roles.

Many middle and small-sized powers are much more preoccupied with their survival. Compared to global powers, their room of maneuvering is limited. Their success in ensuring survival hinges on their ability to play global powers off against each other, viz. external balancing, rather than solely investing in their own material capabilities, viz. internal balancing. Their foreign policy behaviors aim primarily at mitigating the negative consequences of global power competitions on their internal stability and external sovereignty. Compared to global powers, middle and small-sized powers find it difficult to pursue value-oriented normative foreign policies mainly because their material power capabilities are limited.

Unlike some middle powers and many smallsized powers, global powers have the luxury of helping bring into existence a particular external environment to their liking, as well as making use of the existing power balances within the system to maximize their material power capabilities. Stated somewhat differently, global powers do not only aim at maximizing their power capabilities at the expense of their rivals but also endeavor to midwife a particular external environment that reflects their values and norms.

The end of the Cold War era paved the way for strengthening American primacy across the globe, as no other power was in a position to shake up the foundations of this uni-polar era for about fifteen years. The 1990s and much of the 2000s demonstrated that the U.S. was the indispensable power on earth.

The election of Barack Obama to presidency in late 2008 can be read not only as the demonstration of the frustration of the American electorate with the policies of the Bush administration but also the growing need to adjust to the emerging dynamics of the post-American world order. Despite Donald Trump’s strong criticisms of Obama administrations’ foreign policy practices, the former appears to continue with the basic foreign policy strategy of the latter with some nuances. Both rejected nation-building exercises in foreign countries and adopted a more realist and pragmatic foreign policy approach than a liberal one. However, whereas Obama was of more ‘multilateralist’, Trump seems to be more ‘bilateralist’ and ‘unilateralist’.

Both Obama and Trump recognized that the U.S. should no longer play the role of global hegemon in maintaining peace and security. Contrary to the ‘hegemonic stability theory’, the US does not want to play the role of benign hegemon any longer. As for the relations with traditional allies, the key message the United States is now sending is that those allies should spend more on their security and defense. They should not take the American commitment to their security for granted. European allies should both speed up their integration process within EU and contribute more strategic and military capabilities to NATO (Haas, 2017, 2-9). Dealing with the challenges arising from the resurgent Russia, instability in the Balkans and the growing anarchy in the Middle East and North Africa is first and foremost the responsibility of European allies. What happens in these locations affect Europe more than the U.S. It is now abundantly clear that that the U.S. does not want to channel too much of its attention and capabilities to European and Middle Eastern security challenges. Rather, it would like to see its European allies pay much of the bill in such theatres. With Obama and Trump, the focus on great power relations came back. Dealing with China and Russia now appears to be more important than focusing on humanitarian interventions, counter-terrorism and democracy promotion exercises.

The financial crisis that hit western economies in 2008 severely seems to have turned all such western assumptions upside down. The economic crisis in 2008 has not only weakened the specter of the EU to become a global power, both in economic and normative senses, but also made it abundantly clear that the success of the American economic model has been to a significant extent tied to the interdependent economic relations developed with the non-western world, most notably China. The crisis and its aftermath have made it unavoidably clear that the United States is today the most indebted country on earth whereas China the number one creditor country. Besides, majorities across the globe seem to believe that China, the aspiring hegemon, is on the rise whereas the United States, the incumbent hegemon, in terminal decline.

Active Russian agency in the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICSs should be read as Russia’s growing determination to offer an alternative world order to the one shaped by western powers. In Russian strategic thinking, the road to global primacy passes through the entrenchment of Russia’s geopolitical influence in Europe and Eurasia. It is where Russia finds itself in strategic competition with the West.

Russia is a multi-lingual, multi-ethic and multicultural state and this pushes Russian security elites to put an overwhelming stress on Russia’s territorial integrity and national sovereignty over all other concerns.

Russia’s objections to the primacy of the liberal western order also emanate from its peculiar political and cultural values. Unlike the developed western economies which are built on the capitalist values, Russian economy very much relies on the export of commodities in a semi-close economy, such as gas and oil. Unlike the Chinese model in which capitalist modernization process could go hand in hand with authoritarian state policies, Russia offers a particular example of illiberal societies in which the state is extremely involved in economics, social and political life.

According to Eurasianism, Russia is both a European and Asian country at the same time and Russia’s historical mission is to unite the diverse communities in the Eurasian region under Russia’s moral and political leadership. Russia is the geopolitical hegemon of the Eurasian region and without strong Russian leadership neither Russia nor other Eurasian communities would be in a position to restrain western and eastern encroachments. Given Russia’s foreign and security polices over the last decade, one could confidently argue that Eurasianism has now become the dominant school of thought in Russia.

If states are mainly motivated in their external relations by the concern of maximizing their material power capabilities as well as ensuring their long-term survival, interests dominate their foreign policy choices.

The end of the Cold War era paved the way for strengthening American primacy across the globe, as no other power was in a position to shake up the foundations of this unipolar era for about fifteen years.

The key international organizations, such as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, World Bank and NATO all embody the American principles and preferences. However, the Warsaw Pact was established by the Soviet Union.

The EU is by far the most successful example of international institutions aiming at transcending traditional/modern interstate relations through the formation of collective identities and supranational institutions.

The EU High Representative for security and foreign policy is in charge of the European External Action Service that can be considered as the ministry of foreign affairs of the European Union.

Peaceful rise/peaceful development is the strategy that Chinese rulers have been pursuing in their neighborhood since the late 1970s.

The Asia Infrastructure and Investment Bank is an alternative institutional platform whose establishment is masterminded by China under its guidance?

Active Russian agency in the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICSs should be read as Russia’s growing determination to offer an alternative world order to the one shaped by western powers.

The notion of sphere of influence occupies an important place in the Russian geopolitical thinking.

Neo-classical realist approach can be interpreted as a scholarly attempt at successfully merging the tangible and intangible motivations of states’ foreign policy behaviors.