DİPLOMASİ - Deneme Sınavı - 8

Threats leveled against Turkey’s national security have changed during this process. While the end of Cold War reduced the threats stemming from the Soviet Union and positively affected Turkish-Russian relations, developments in the Middle East, Balkans and Caucasus have started to become more important in the context of Turkey’s security.

To AKP governments, Turkey should be defined as a central country, suggesting that Turkish rulers adopt a Turkey-centric worldview in defining national interests and policies. In addition, Turkey should be in a position to feel itself as part of each and every geographical location. The main foreign policy objective of Turkey should be to help shape regional developments decisively and to forge interests-based pragmatic relationships with key global actors. Turkish foreign policy should be defined and conducted in a multi-lateral and multi-dimensional fashion so as to make sure that regional and global developments do not negatively affect the liberal democratic transformation and economic development processes at home.

Turkey has been one of the most important members of NATO since its accession to the Alliance in 1952. The correct answer is D.

Turkey has been one of the most important members of NATO since its accession to the Alliance in 1952. Having defined for many years its foreign, defense and security policies on the basis of NATO membership, Turkey began to adopt a more questioning and critical perspective towards the Alliance with the end of the Cold War. Although NATO continues to maintain its importance in Turkish foreign and security policy thinking, it would be wrong to suggest that this is at the same level as it was during the Cold War era. The correct answer is B.

After the Second World War ended, Turkey wanted to join NATO mainly from a security oriented perspective. Not possessing the means to cope with the threats stemming from the Soviet Union on its own (for instance, Moscow’s territorial demands on the Straits and the provinces of Kars and Ardahan in eastern Anatolia) Turkey wanted to secure Western help by joining the multilateral security organization NATO. 

Another factor that initially pushed Turkey to seek membership in NATO and later on proved to be one of the main reasons for its justification in the eyes of Turkish people was that NATO membership was considered as an important milestone in Turkey’s decades-old Westernization/ Europeanization/modernization process. Thanks to NATO membership, Turkey could argue for many years that it was a Western/European state.  The. correct answer is E.

The United States defined Turkey as the unsinkable aircraft carrier during the Cold War. The Soviet Union wanted to get control of the straits and eastern part of Anatolia in the immediate aftermath of the World War II and this prompted Turkey to seek security cooperation with the United States. The correct answer is A.

Turkey initially opposed to NATO’s intervention in Libya. This operation was at the beginning launched by Britain and France outside NATO framework and then taken over by the Alliance. Turkey was extremely sensitive on the possibility of this NATO operation causing severe human losses in Libya and negatively affecting Turkey’s image across the Islamic world. The correct answer is C.

US-led Western international community against the Soviet Union during the Cold War era. The correct answer is A.

The revision of the Lasuanne regulations on the status of Turkish Straits through the Montreaux Convention in 1936, the incorporation of Hatay region into Turkey in 1939, and the settlement of the Mousul question and the border dispute with Iraq in 1926 are all examples to the use of international law and diplomacy in Turkish foreign policy. The correct answer is D.

The revision of the Lasuanne regulations on the status of Turkish Straits through the Montreaux Convention in 1936, the incorporation of Hatay region into Turkey in 1939, and the settlement of the Mousul question and the border dispute with Iraq in 1926 are all examples to the use of international law and diplomacy in Turkish foreign policy. Diplomacy backed by hard power capability and diplomatic initiatives conferring legitimacy on military victories constitute the backbone of Ataturk’s diplomatic legacy. The correct answer is E.

Turkey initially opposed to NATO’s intervention in Libya. This operation was at the beginning launched by Britain and France outside NATO framework and then taken over by the Alliance. Turkey was extremely sensitive on the possibility of this NATO operation causing severe human losses in Libya and negatively affecting Turkey’s image across the Islamic world. However, once the allies sorted out their disagreements and decided that NATO should take over the operational responsibility, Turkey became a part of this consensus. However, Turkey played an important role in setting the limits and operational mandate of the operation to be carried out in Libya. Turkey was highly sensitive that ground troops not be used during the operation and the primary mission to be controlling the embargo imposed on Gaddafi forces from the sea and air. The correct answer is B.

Moreover, Turkey has evaluated NATO‘s missile defense shield system in the context of its relations with Iran. The assumption held by the security circles in Turkey was that in case some parts of this system were installed in Turkish territories, Iran might have considered it as a threat against itself and adopted a more hostile attitude towards Turkey. This very much explains why Turkey increased its efforts to ensure that NATO’s new security document adopted in Lisbon in November 2010 does not mention Iran as a threat and emphasize that the radar component of the system to be deployed in Turkey is for purely defensive purposes. The correct answer is C.

Whereas one group of scholars argues that foreign policy behaviors are mainly a function of intangible factors of material power capabilities, geographical locations, and external developments, another group contends that intangible factors of personality traits, belief systems, world views, ideologies and cultures play more decisive roles.

Many middle and small-sized powers are much more preoccupied with their survival. Compared to global powers, their room of maneuvering is limited. Their success in ensuring survival hinges on their ability to play global powers off against each other, viz. external balancing, rather than solely investing in their own material capabilities, viz. internal balancing. Their foreign policy behaviors aim primarily at mitigating the negative consequences of global power competitions on their internal stability and external sovereignty. Compared to global powers, middle and small-sized powers find it difficult to pursue value-oriented normative foreign policies mainly because their material power capabilities are limited.

Unlike some middle powers and many smallsized powers, global powers have the luxury of helping bring into existence a particular external environment to their liking, as well as making use of the existing power balances within the system to maximize their material power capabilities. Stated somewhat differently, global powers do not only aim at maximizing their power capabilities at the expense of their rivals but also endeavor to midwife a particular external environment that reflects their values and norms.

The end of the Cold War era paved the way for strengthening American primacy across the globe, as no other power was in a position to shake up the foundations of this uni-polar era for about fifteen years. The 1990s and much of the 2000s demonstrated that the U.S. was the indispensable power on earth.

The election of Barack Obama to presidency in late 2008 can be read not only as the demonstration of the frustration of the American electorate with the policies of the Bush administration but also the growing need to adjust to the emerging dynamics of the post-American world order. Despite Donald Trump’s strong criticisms of Obama administrations’ foreign policy practices, the former appears to continue with the basic foreign policy strategy of the latter with some nuances. Both rejected nation-building exercises in foreign countries and adopted a more realist and pragmatic foreign policy approach than a liberal one. However, whereas Obama was of more ‘multilateralist’, Trump seems to be more ‘bilateralist’ and ‘unilateralist’.

Both Obama and Trump recognized that the U.S. should no longer play the role of global hegemon in maintaining peace and security. Contrary to the ‘hegemonic stability theory’, the US does not want to play the role of benign hegemon any longer. As for the relations with traditional allies, the key message the United States is now sending is that those allies should spend more on their security and defense. They should not take the American commitment to their security for granted. European allies should both speed up their integration process within EU and contribute more strategic and military capabilities to NATO (Haas, 2017, 2-9). Dealing with the challenges arising from the resurgent Russia, instability in the Balkans and the growing anarchy in the Middle East and North Africa is first and foremost the responsibility of European allies. What happens in these locations affect Europe more than the U.S. It is now abundantly clear that that the U.S. does not want to channel too much of its attention and capabilities to European and Middle Eastern security challenges. Rather, it would like to see its European allies pay much of the bill in such theatres. With Obama and Trump, the focus on great power relations came back. Dealing with China and Russia now appears to be more important than focusing on humanitarian interventions, counter-terrorism and democracy promotion exercises.

The financial crisis that hit western economies in 2008 severely seems to have turned all such western assumptions upside down. The economic crisis in 2008 has not only weakened the specter of the EU to become a global power, both in economic and normative senses, but also made it abundantly clear that the success of the American economic model has been to a significant extent tied to the interdependent economic relations developed with the non-western world, most notably China. The crisis and its aftermath have made it unavoidably clear that the United States is today the most indebted country on earth whereas China the number one creditor country. Besides, majorities across the globe seem to believe that China, the aspiring hegemon, is on the rise whereas the United States, the incumbent hegemon, in terminal decline.

Active Russian agency in the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICSs should be read as Russia’s growing determination to offer an alternative world order to the one shaped by western powers. In Russian strategic thinking, the road to global primacy passes through the entrenchment of Russia’s geopolitical influence in Europe and Eurasia. It is where Russia finds itself in strategic competition with the West.