DİPLOMASİ - Deneme Sınavı - 6

The financial crisis that hit western economies in 2008 severely seems to have turned all such western assumptions upside down. The economic crisis in 2008 has not only weakened the specter of the EU to become a global power, both in economic and normative senses, but also made it abundantly clear that the success of the American economic model has been to a significant extent tied to the interdependent economic relations developed with the non-western world, most notably China. The crisis and its aftermath have made it unavoidably clear that the United States is today the most indebted country on earth whereas China the number one creditor country. Besides, majorities across the globe seem to believe that China, the aspiring hegemon, is on the rise whereas the United States, the incumbent hegemon, in terminal decline.

Whereas China deems its phenomenal rise as part of its normalization process, the United States finds in China a strong contender for its global hegemony. While Chinese see their country’s efforts to leave behind the ‘centuries of humiliation’ for good as China’s rightful return to its glorious days, the majority of westerners tend to feel skeptical about the end results of this process. To many Chinese, China had been the cradle of global politics for ages by the time the western European nations eclipsed China in terms of economic output, technological innovations and military capabilities. By the middle of the 19^th century, nearly half of global economic production had originated from China. Therefore, the Chinese believe that their country’s rise in recent decades should not be interpreted as the success story of an ordinary country climbing up the ladder of power. Instead, Chinese share the view that China’s recent successes are manifestations of China’s normalization and returning to world history as a major power (Xiang, 2016, 53-62).

Since President Putin came to power in late 1990s, Russia has witnessed a national revival. Having an imperial legacy in the background and acting as one of the two superpowers of the Cold War era, it is quite natural and understandable that Russia wants to leave the troubled years of the 1990s behind and put a serious claim to global power status in the emerging century. Recently, Russia has come under international limelight once again following its annexation of Crimea into its territory, the support that it gives to the separatist groups in the eastern part of Ukraine and its military involvement in Syria on the side of Assad regime. Hardly a day passes without Russia being criticized by western circles of pursuing aggressive, assertive and neo-imperial policies in its near-abroad. The major criticism directed to Russia is that unlike the post-modern powers of the European Union and the liberal power the United States, Russia acts as a typical realpolitik power which deeply believes in the primacy of material power capabilities, the use of brute military force and commanding spheres of influence in global power politics. Russia is believed to have been acting as a nineteenth century power in the twenty-first century.

Whereas one group of scholars argues that foreign policy behaviors are mainly a function of intangible factors of material power capabilities, geographical locations, and external developments, another group contends that intangible factors of personality traits, belief systems, world views, ideologies and cultures play more decisive roles (Neack, 2014).

Compared to global powers, middle and small-sized powers find it difficult to pursue value-oriented normative foreign policies mainly because their material power capabilities are limited.

Understanding the diplomatic practices of such global powers as the United States (U.S.), European Union (EU), Russia and China help us better comprehend the dynamics of international politics and the future direction of global order.

Making sense of foreign policy and diplomatic practices of the U.S. in the Middle East cannot be properly accomplished without taking into account the ideational/value-oriented logic of democracy promotion.

Pax-Sinica can be said to be a goal China pursues.

The geographical location of the country, being walled from other places through two oceans to the east and west, enabled the early generations to focus their attention solely on economic development and political cohesion at home.

Since the early years of the Cold War era, the U.S. has mainly adopted an ‘internationalist’ mentality and acted as a liberal power putting its liberal democratic norms at the center of its foreign and security policy engagements across the globe (Johnstone, 2011, 13-17).

The assumption was that economic, social and political integration among western European liberal democratic states would not only bring into existence a strong market for American goods and capital but also help the U.S. contain the existential threat emanating from the Soviet Union more cost-effectively.

The success of the EU emanates from its ability to have brought into existence a new understanding thereby its foreign policy takes it legitimacy from the common ‘we’ feeling among members.

It does not construct its foreign relations on the basis of a normative understating in that it is China’s historical and civilizational mission to project its values abroad.

All the other options have wrong information regarding the diplomacy of the European Union except for B.

Too much dependence on American security commitment has not only militated against the EU’s ability to forge a distinctive European approach to global security problems but also led the EU members to underinvest in security and common foreign policy.

China now seems to be the country that has the most potential to help re-structure the dynamics of the liberal world order in the years to come.

Such connections to the non-western world seem to offer China an advantage like importing many of the raw materials from these countries that it needs for its production capacity to continue.

Among its principles, there is primacy of shame culture over guilt culture not the other way round

What seem to set apart China from western powers are its commitment to state-led capitalism, society-based morality, hierarchical organization of societal relations, centralized administrative system, a defensive realpolitik security culture and a Confucian understanding of the Chinese state as a civilization.

China has also been trying to bring into existence rival international organizations that reflect China’s interests and priorities much better than the existing global institutions. The formation of Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS, New Development Bank, the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank, the One Belt One Road Initiative all attest to China’s determination to help create alternative institutional structures that could offer China-friendly solutions to global public good problems.

The major criticism directed to Russia is that unlike the post-modern powers of the European Union and the liberal power the United States, Russia acts as a typical realpolitik power which deeply believes in the primacy of material power capabilities, the use of brute military force and commanding spheres of influence in global power politics.